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Moral Pathology

A. E. Giles, M. D.


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
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MORAL PATHOLOGY

MORAL PATHOLOGY

BY

ARTHUR E. GILES, M.D., B.Sc.

"Sin, like disease, is a vital process. It is a function and not an entity. It must be studied as a section of anthropology. No preconceived idea must be allowed to interfere with our investigation of the deranged spiritual function, any more than the old ideas of demoniacal possession must be allowed to interfere with our study of epilepsy. Spiritual pathology is a proper subject for direct observation and analysis, like any other subject involving a series of living actions."—OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES.

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1895

To

MY FATHER

THIS VOLUME IS

AFFECTIONATELY INSCRIBED

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PREFACE

THE frequent overlapping and interlacing of moral and medical questions in daily work has impressed me, as it has impressed others, with the fact that a man's moral nature is not something separate and supernatural, owning no allegiance to natural laws, but an integral part of himself, dependent upon and in turn influencing his condition of mind and body. The comparison of sin with sickness is no new one, but it has been made, as a rule, disconnectedly and by way of illustration. I believe that a systematic review of "Moral Pathology" on these lines has not been done, and that some useful light may be thrown on the subject of morals by the consideration of the principles of moral disease in medical fashion.

I do not pretend to have dealt with the matter exhaustively. I have wished rather to give an outline of it, leaving the filling in of details to be done in some measure by the reader. The spirit

of the book is indicated in the extract from *The Poet at the Breakfast-Table* which appears on the title-page, whilst its scope will be gathered from the list of chapters.

To a certain but limited extent, the condition of the body is influenced by the will; in the domain of mind and morals the will has a more absolute (though even here not unlimited) dominion. So at the outset I disclaim any intention of minimising the seriousness of wrong-doing by furnishing comfortable excuses to the morally weak. My hope is rather that a clearer understanding of the scope and limitations of moral responsibility may increase its effectiveness; and that by a thoughtful inquiry into the nature, causes, symptoms and results of moral disease, a better insight may be gained into the methods of successfully overcoming such disease in one's self and in others.

ARTHUR E. GILES.

57 QUEEN ANNE STREET, W.
September, 1895.

MORAL PATHOLOGY

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

THE ardent longing of the world's well-wishers is to see realised a perfected humanity. *Mens sana in corpore sano:* this is the ideal. Taken in this sense, the "mind" must be understood to include the moral as well as the mental qualities. There are, then, the three parts of man's nature to be cared for, in order that the healthy body, the healthy mind, and the healthy soul may together form the perfect man. Moreover, they must be cared for in the order given, for all true progress, like building, must be from the lower to the higher. The study of the body's health is in many and safe hands; health of mind is more difficult to attain, and the laws by which it is governed are

not so plain; yet in this field also is much advance being made. In the humblest walks of life, education is taking the place of ignorance; in the higher, culture is being grafted on to education.

Health of soul is the highest, and therefore the hardest to achieve; and the difficulties have been increased, rather than diminished, by the mysteries in which it has been enfolded. These must be stripped off; and it will then be seen that the health of the soul, like that of the body, depends on the fulfilment of the laws by which it is governed. Science has many daughters; the science of ethics is amongst the youngest of them. She has, however, a vigorous vitality, and bids fair to thrive in a manner that will justify the most sanguine hopes.

Some analogies from the science of medicine will help us. When, in the Darker Ages, medicine was under the sway of empiricism, progress was slow; observation was often overshadowed by theory; and by the application of empirical rules and abstract reasoning to the treatment of the sick, results were proportionately uncertain. Now that the fact is better known, that no single theory of disease will cover all its forms, many old formulas are sinking into their proper insignificance, and the sick person engages much of the

attention formerly given to the abstract disease. The modern physician does not remain content with the study and treatment of the symptoms of sickness; he goes further and looks for the cause. Having found this, he attacks it, and trusts that the symptoms will disappear when their cause is removed. He tries also to make his *diagnosis* exact; he recognises that the outward signs of two very different ailments may be much alike; and that what has cured the one may have no effect on the other.

A few leaves may, then, be borrowed with profit from the doctor's note-book:—

Moral disease is infinitely complex; no single theory will account for all cases.

A knowledge of moral disease cannot be obtained in the retirement of the hermit's cave, nor in the quiet of the preacher's study, but only among men who are morally sick.

In moral, as in medical pathology, the patient, and not the disease, must be treated.

It is in vain that remedies are applied to relieve the symptoms of moral disorder, if their cause remain untouched.

A method of moral treatment which has suc-

ceeded in one instance may fail in another because the two cases are only outwardly alike.

Why is it that, in spite of all the moral systems and teaching of many thousand years, the condition of men to-day is no better than it is? that

> "age to age succeeds,
> Blowing a noise of tongues and deeds,
> A dust of systems and of creeds,"

and that the net result in the department of morality is yet so unsatisfactory? Many answers may be given. I will suggest a few.

It is partly because moral teaching is so often conveyed in old formulas, whose words are learnt by heart, while their meaning is neither thought about nor understood.

It is partly because teaching should be given in the days when the nature is plastic, in childhood, by parents; and many parents are unfit for it, or hand over the responsibility to those who, from a lack of personal interest, do not understand the nature of the individual child.

Moreover, the moral code laid down in early life is often out of harmony with human nature; it is unnatural and therefore repellent; and the moral sense, distorted and baffled by insignificant

trifles, loses its keenness and its sense of proportion in dealing with the larger questions of right and wrong.

It is partly because people requiring moral treatment are dealt with by the gross, instead of individually.

It is partly because the motives for right action that are taught are of a supernatural order, and are, by their very nature, not lasting.

It is partly because the causes and origin of moral disease are not understood.

Lastly, it is partly because many teachers are not able to support their teaching by personal example.

It is not my purpose to lay down any new ethical code; nor to attempt to re-adjust the old ones. But by considering the subject of moral disease from an independent standpoint, partly freed from traditional phraseology, it may be possible to see some of its features as they really are. The set forms of words in which many of our ideas of right and wrong are cast have had their uses; they once expressed living ideas. But ideas are living and consequently changing things; even ideas about right and wrong must change; and the effect of retaining old phrases and formulas is often this, that they cease to convey any idea at all; all

that is left is a vague sense of security and comfort in the words, such as the well-known, pious old lady derived from the sound of "that blessed word, Mesopotamia."

Definitions have their use; but definition is the limitation of growth. Once plunge a living thought into the fixing-solution of definition, and its growth ceases. It is then inert, and is fit to be labelled and packed away in a museum. Its form may be fair, but its life is gone.

The wish to deal with the subject of moral disease, untrammelled by any set form of words, is one reason why the religious side of the matter is here left untouched. A second reason is that "the good life has a claim upon us in virtue of its supreme worth to humanity. It therefore rests for its justification on no external authority, and on no system of supernatural rewards and punishments, but on the nature of man as a rational and social being." The additional incentives to good conduct which religion supplies are a great help in the preservation of moral health; but they do not in any way lessen the obligation to right living which is imposed upon us by our very nature as "rational and social beings." A third reason for not dwelling on the religious aspect of the question is a wholesome dread of the admonition which

" Urania speaks with darkened brow :—
Thou pratest here where thou art least ;
This faith has many a purer priest,
And many an abler voice than thou."

CHAPTER II.

THE ORIGIN OF MORAL DISEASE.

A QUESTION stands upon the threshold of this inquiry into moral pathology: What is moral disease? By what criterion are we to judge whether any action is morally normal or pathological, that is, right or wrong?

But as all definitions presuppose a certain amount of previous knowledge, there are some preliminaries which must be discussed before we can give a definition of moral disease. One of the best ways of finding out what a thing *is*, is to ascertain *how it came to be what it is.* I shall therefore prepare the way for the consideration, in the next chapter, of the *nature* of moral disease by an inquiry here into its *origin.*

We must, however, start at a stage even earlier than this. Before we can understand disease, we must know what constitutes health. Our first duty is, therefore, to trace the origin of the moral

distinctions, right and wrong, and of the standards of moral health which were thus formed.

Then we shall consider in what ways men came to depart from the standards of moral health, and so developed moral disease.

It will avoid much confusion if we remember that in studying the origin of the distinction between right and wrong there are two distinct questions to be considered: firstly, its origin in the history of the race; secondly, its origin in the life of the individual. For though the development of the individual is in many respects a repetition in miniature of that of the race, that repetition has the form rather of an abstract, epitome, or summary, than of a full and verbatim report. Or it may be compared to a series of results of calculations, of which the details of working out have been effaced. The individual life is too short to work out for itself all the theorems of existence, but starts with the results of these ready-stated in the form of postulates and axioms.

Thus the intuition of the modern man is the inheritance of the cumulative experience of the ancients, condensed and ready for use.

That man has probably developed out of lower types of life is now generally admitted. What these may have been need not trouble us; nor is there

reason to be ashamed that our far-off ancestors were lowly-born. On the contrary, the fact is gratifying; for the descent of man has been an ascent; and if there has been such startling progress in the past, it augurs well for the future, and the contemplation of perfection in the ages to come becomes increasingly hopeful.

In the days of the earliest men, before they were associated in tribes, the duty of each individual was summed up in two obligations, self-preservation and the rearing of offspring. The fulfilment of these two obligations was a source of gratification, and duty and pleasure went hand in hand. To destroy any individuals who interfered with either duty brought no more compunction than the slaying of animals for food. Wrong consisted in disobeying one or other of these mandates, and was followed by prompt retribution of physical suffering upon the individual or upon his offspring. But immediate gratification of the senses was no doubt discovered before long to be followed in certain instances by harm, either to the individual or to his children. In this conflict of present with prospective advantage lay the germ of the contest between right and wrong. The conflict assumed more definite form when individuals were collected into families and tribes. It became essential for

self-preservation that the safety of the tribe should be first considered; and the individual had to surrender his personal advantage at certain times for the good of the rest of the community. Thus arose the contest between the interests of self and those of others. The tendency to self-gratification was at first kept in check mainly by two considerations: firstly, fear of the vengeance of the souls of the departed heroes of the tribe; secondly, the authority of the chief, who was necessarily the strongest man. Herbert Spencer has ably traced out the development of these two influences into the two principal incentives to right conduct, religion and law. To review his arguments in their order would take me far beyond the scope of this work; nor is there any need for me to recapitulate indifferently what he has done in a masterly way. A third factor soon came into operation, the influence, namely, of custom, growing by degrees into that complex structure, social opinion.

In this manner four standards of conduct came into being: firstly, that of the individual, framed on considerations of self-preservation, of the successful rearing of offspring, and of the harmonious living with others; then the other three standards, the religious, the political, and the social, consisting

mainly of traditions and precepts, embodying the principles that had been found most advantageous for the fulfilling of the above aims.

As mind developed, the sense-presentations of these facts became abstract ideas; the higher ideas overshadowed the lower; present gain became more and more subservient to future good; the desire to benefit others as a means to personal advantage became a sufficient end in itself; and altruism finally triumphed over selfishness, as the ultimate goal of conduct.

In this evolution of conduct, all four standards had their share. The authoritative standards of law and religion, strengthened by penal codes of considerable severity, compelled a certain degree of obedience; and, in some measure at least, men were forced to do the right, at a time when the right was, for them, a question of expediency rather than of inclination. In the course of time, right conduct assumed something more of the nature of habit, whilst the reasonableness of right and the disadvantages of wrong became felt. At this stage the authority of priests and rulers was seldom if ever questioned, and the inquiry "What is right?" could be answered simply: it consisted in obedience to the Divine Will and to the law of the land. Public opinion was thus formed, and became the

third great standard. But this standard was and still is faulty in one important respect: it had regard to the outward appearances of actions rather than to their intrinsic worth. Society cares little for motives; it pronounces only upon actions. It asks for forms, for outward conformity; it makes no inquiries into the subjective side of morality. Lastly, there came a time when men began to question authority, and to think out for themselves the relations of right and wrong. At first this was done by only a few, and they met with but scant appreciation from those to whom authority was the only oracle. It was a feature of later civilisation that this habit of thinking spread more and more. From it arose comparatively crude ethical theories, embodying, however, for the most part, in some form or other, the fundamental truth that the aim of morality is happiness. In some cases an immediate advantage was sought; others, more far-seeing, strove for ultimate happiness. Some sought only the happiness of the individual; others that of the race. In this last century more definite efforts have been made to establish and define a science of ethics.

Such is a very brief outline of the development of the moral standard in the history of the race. And now we must pass on to the second question:

What is the origin of the moral standard in the life of the individual?

The individual starts life under the influence of two controlling forces: an innate inheritance and an external environment. The first gives him intuitions; the second controls him with traditions. His intuitions, as I said before, represent the net resultant of experience laboriously acquired and accumulated in the course of many generations; the traditions that he learns represent much the same experiences handed down in a collateral fashion and in less condensed form. The result is that in the main an individual's intuitions of right and wrong correspond fairly well with the teaching he receives from without. Further, the child, as he develops, becomes acquainted, although it may be not discerningly, with the three external standards I have spoken of. Of the three, the religious impresses him the most, because it receives a double sanction. Tradition has ascribed to it a supernatural origin; and his own intuition is to him inexplicable, except on the assumption that this also is supernatural. As he grows, the individualistic standard tends to develop; he asks himself why this is right and that is wrong. It is possible for such questionings to be checked, if his early teachers refer him, as sole explanation, to the *ipse*

dixit of revelation. Otherwise, this side of morality gains increasing force and dimensions, until in his mature years the other three standards come to be accepted or rejected according as they harmonise or not with his own standard.

After this rapid survey of the origin of moral distinctions in the race and in the individual, we have now to consider in what ways and in what order the inner tendencies of man's nature came into conflict with standards of right. That is to say, we have to review the evolution of moral disease.

The primitive forms of moral disease were probably such as are associated with the basis of man's nature, namely his body; they had to do with gratification of the senses. Of this we have some evidence in children; with them, the earliest wrong actions are generally of this kind; faults due to greed are perhaps the commonest of all. As the nature expands, and its capacities are unfolded, other kinds of faults are possible. Looking again at the child we see how many kinds of wrong-doing are associated with the fundamental emotions: anger, revenge, cruelty and the like. Some emotions, more complex, are developed later, notably those of sex; and the faults related to them are also seen later. By degrees the intellectual faculties are developed, and the faults due to

their wrongful exercise appear also. Cunning, deceit, dishonesty, vanity, arrogance, injustice, ill-balanced ambition, and a host of others belong to this class; whilst underlying almost all other forms of moral disorder is the many-headed hydra of selfishness—the result of a distortion of the fundamental tendency of self-preservation.

It must, of course, be understood that a simple classification of moral diseases into (1) those associated with the senses; (2) those associated with the emotions; and (3) those associated with the intellect, is not possible. Every added faculty becomes related to those already present. So that moral disorders associated with complex faculties such as intellect, are often associated also with the emotions and with the senses. Thus, while greed is mainly sensual, lust is partly sensual and partly emotional. Anger is mainly emotional, but revenge is partly emotional, partly intellectual. Nevertheless the account of the evolution of moral disorder on the broad lines above indicated will probably be found to be, in the main, correct.

In the beginning of the history of the race, as in the early life of the child, the first condition was probably innocence, not in its derivative sense of "doing no harm," *i.e.*, absence of guilt, but in its sense of "ignorance of wrong." But when the

knowledge of good and evil was attained, there was a "fall" from the condition of innocence or ignorance; just as the "fall" occurs at some time in the early life of every child. The first wrong-doing that is recognised as such is, for that child, "the fall."

The origin of moral disease is thus to be traced in the development of those very capacities of body and mind which are necessary for moral health. The condition of there being possibilities for good is that there be possibilities of evil. As Carlyle says in "Sartor Resartus": "A strange contradiction lay in me, and I as yet knew not the solution of it; knew not that spiritual music can spring only from discords set in harmony; that but for evil there were no good, as victory is only possible by battle." Moreover, the higher an individual's capacities for good, the greater also are his possibilities of evil. "When a wise man makes a false step," says George Meredith, "will he not go farther than a fool?"

Medical science teaches us that the more complex the development of any bodily organ, the greater is its liability to various diseases and to degeneration. And so we find that certain forms of insanity are relatively more common among the cultured than among the uneducated; whilst men of the

highest genius not uncommonly show some kind of moral obliquity. "The passionate heart of the poet is whirled into folly and vice." Infinitely better, however, is the great capacity for good, though necessarily accompanied by increased liability to evil, than a dull mediocrity, or a still lower inferiority, from which neither much good nor much evil is likely to come. Innocence is no doubt better than evil known and yielded to; but evil known and overcome is even better than innocence.

The origin of moral disease need not therefore be regarded as anything very mysterious; nor need its existence be looked upon as a blot upon the fair scheme of creation; indeed, many of the most sublime virtues, such as mercy and forgiveness, humility, patience and self-control, would never have been known had it not been for the moral disease which called them forth, and over which, in turn, they triumphed. Out of Death, the worst, comes Life, the best.

"Surely in the great beginning, God made all things good, and still
That soul-sickness men call sinning entered not without His will.
Nay, our wisest have asserted that, as shade enhances light,
Evil is but good perverted, wrong is but the foil of right.
Banish sickness, then you banish joy for health to all that live;
Slay all sin, all good must vanish, good being but comparative."

ADAM LINDSAY GORDON (*The Road to Avernus*).

CHAPTER III.

THE NATURE OF MORAL DISEASE.

WE are now in a position to consider the question, "What is moral disease?"

We have seen in the previous chapter how the experience of many generations as to what was best both for the individual and for the race became defined and formulated in various sets of "rules of conduct"; and we named three principal sets of rules or standards, the legal, the religious, and the social. These codes set forth, therefore, the duty of man, what he ought to do, and what he ought to avoid. We have seen also that every individual born into a civilized community is brought under the influence of these rules of conduct; and has, in addition, an innate sense or intuition which in the main corroborates and approves of these rules. From these combined sources, a *moral law* is derived, to which the individual is required to conform.

The moral law explains what things are right, and what other things are wrong; and what the moral

law does from without, the moral sense does from within. Once the right or wrong nature of an action has been thus made clear, there is an impulse to do the right; this is *conscience.* When the promptings of conscience are habitually yielded to, the individual's condition is one of *moral health.*

Moral disease may therefore be defined as *disregard of conscience.* Moral disease is not the wrong action itself; this is but a symptom; the malady consists in the mental condition which allows of disobedience to the voice of conscience.

The word "conscience" is commonly used in three distinct senses:—

1. As that which distinguishes between right and wrong. I have called this the moral sense.
2. As that which prompts to right actions. I have called this the moral impulse.
3. As that feeling of satisfaction which follows right, or of dissatisfaction which follows wrong, as expressed in the terms, "a good or bad conscience." I use the word "conscience" as comprising the second and third meanings.

Men do not differ from one another in their conscience; in all, conscience says, "Do the right; what thou knowest to be right." But all are not equally obedient to this voice, and consequently, all are not equally morally healthy.

At the same time, in their estimate of what is right and what is wrong men also differ; for this is the function, not of conscience, but of reason; and consequently their actions may be widely divergent, and yet they may be equally healthy because equally obedient. The moral health of each individual has, therefore, to be judged of in relation to his standard of right and wrong.

No standard can be final. The standard of society is notoriously faulty. I pointed out in the previous chapter that society can take cognizance of outward appearances only; and further, it often gravely misapprehends the relative gravity of offences. A single lapse from virtue is frequently visited with much greater severity than a lifetime of harshness or unkindness. More inconsistent still, it often reserves its chief and most enduring censures for mere faults of *savoir-faire.*

The standard of the law is often hopelessly wrong; indeed, the "uncertainty of the law" has come to be a proverb, and it has been found necessary to make a distinction between "law" and "equity."

The standard of the Church, though on the whole admirable, is not always adequate. It is apt to be unpractical, visionary; it takes too little count of the progress of thought, and of the varying conditions of life. Not uncommonly it fosters

an irrational altruism at the expense of a rational egoism. It has, however, a vast sphere of usefulness; it is the one safe standard for moral children, and for those who are not able to frame a healthy standard for themselves. In saying this, there is no implication that it is necessarily unfit for moral adults; and many who are able to form their own standard find that it agrees very well with that of the Church. But in actual life we find that there are many persons whose standard differs from that of the Church, and is, nevertheless, as good.

These three imperfect standards have their place and value. They serve, at least, as approximations towards a perfect code of rules for conduct. It is not possible to trace back every individual question of right and wrong to its ultimate basis; and these temporary approximations should then be adhered to. They form a basis upon which every thinking individual may and should form a standard of his own, not lower, but higher than any of the other three.

In furtherance of this object, the following considerations may assist.

The best standard has as its aims:—

1. As regards the individual: the development and exercise of all his bodily and mental faculties,

with a view to the achievement of happiness, both present and future, and of usefulness.

2. As regards the race: its preservation with development in a condition of well-being and of mutual helpfulness.

The means by which these aims are to be attained require continual re-adjustment in relation to developing faculties and advancing thought. In a moral code there is, and can be, no finality.

The sphere of morals thus embraces every other department of life, physical, emotional, mental, social and political.

Further, it is to be noted that most actions are *relatively* right or wrong. There are a few wrong actions which are probably intrinsically wrong, such as injustice, cruelty, oppression, dishonesty, and so forth; but even many wrongs of this class have from time to time received the sanction of law and custom. Killing is considered right if done on a large enough scale, as in war. Slavery and deception have received countenance from ancient writings — some of them regarded as authoritative. Most actions are, however, bipolar; one end is right and the other wrong. In other words, most sins are the negative aspect of certain qualities of which the positive aspect are virtues.

A few instances will make this clear. The same characteristics which, properly directed, lead to prudence, may, wrongly directed, appear as cowardice. Prodigality is often the result of exaggerated generosity. Kindness, if not well balanced, may lead to weakness. A strict conscientiousness, if not tempered by mercy, may lead to hardness and Pharisaism. Native shrewdness may pass over, by stages of diplomacy and cunning, to deceit. For this reason a single moral trait can seldom be judged of by itself; it must be taken in conjunction with other moral features. And, as will appear more fully later on, in dealing with the subject of moral treatment, a deficiency in moral character will often require to be remedied, not directly, but by cultivating or controlling some other characteristic, the deficiency or excess of which leads to the particular fault under consideration.

Standards must necessarily vary with age, culture and knowledge, and the question is, Must an individual conform to any other standard but his own? To this I answer No or Yes, according as his actions affect himself alone or others also. In the former case everyone must be "a law unto himself," and his anxiety should be this, to follow in all things the dictates of his conscience. But in

matters affecting others, the rules of conduct which receive general assent are to be respected; not in the direction of laxity of conduct, in contravention of his own higher dictates, but in the direction of additional restraint and severity; for from the point of view of the community many things are inexpedient because of their influence on others which are not wrong as concerns the individual.

At the same time it must be remembered that there are circumstances in which an individual may violate the commonly-accepted rules of conduct with a proper motive, and in so doing he may show, not moral disease, but moral health.

To sum up. When reduced to its simplest terms moral disease consists of a disregard of that impulse to do the right, which we call conscience. Wrong actions are the various forms which this disobedience to conscience takes. But in practice it is impossible to analyse every man's impulses; and, moreover, some kind of common working basis is required. The tacit assumption, therefore, is that in the main the reason of men will lead them to hold similar views as to what is right and what is wrong; and that any man who acts in opposition to generally accepted ideas of right is acting also in opposition to his own conscience; and that he is therefore morally diseased. This

assumption will, no doubt, be wrong in many cases; but it is inevitable, unless we can ascertain the individual circumstances.

In what follows it will be assumed that the various moral disorders treated of are universally regarded as pathological conditions. It is, however, the duty of the moral physician to inquire into every case individually, and take it on its merits.

He will then discover that many men whose actions do not fall into line with those of their neighbours are nevertheless acting in conformity to their standard of right, the effect of which will be to broaden his sympathies and to give him a better opinion of human nature than he would obtain from a merely superficial survey.

CHAPTER IV.

THE MORAL PHYSICIAN.

A MORAL physician may be said to be a person who has made a special study of moral disease, and who endeavours, day by day, to remedy it. Such an endeavour, at one time or other, is made, professedly or otherwise, by all who have the interests of mankind at heart; but without a special knowledge of the subject it is clear that there can be no claim to the title. Ministers and priests of the churches, of whatever creed, are moral physicians by profession; but even among them there are some who are physicians in name only, for they know little or nothing of their subject.

Besides study, the qualifications necessary for the office are: — insight, to discern where the secret of the malady lies; sympathy, that he may gain the confidence of his patients, for without this he will court failure; experience, derived from a personal acquaintance with men and their ways; and the ability to illustrate his teaching by his

own example. It need hardly be added that he must himself have faith in his treatment, and that his heart must be in his work. Nearly every moral convalescent thinks that he can treat his own disease in others; this by no means always follows, for his recently acquired knowledge may be too partial. In this, as in other departments of life, when a man thinks he can teach his fellows something, it is well that he should stop to consider whether he has not simply discovered for himself what most people already knew.

The want of experience is a frequent cause of failure. The subject is not one which can be properly acquired in the seclusion of a hermitage, or in the peaceful calm of the study. Those who have in this way learnt what they know of moral disease may have a tolerably good understanding of their own condition; but if their deductions concerning the condition of others are based on this kind of experience, they will often hit very wide of the mark. Those whose knowledge of physic has been derived from books, instead of by the bedside, are apt to be perplexed at their want of success. But it is not very surprising, for, in the first place, they have a tendency to treat the disease instead of the patient; and, in the second place, they may fail to discover what the patient is

really suffering from, although, once they know this, they may know well enough, in theory, what is the appropriate remedy.

That a man should pose as a moral physician, whose heart is not in his work, and who has little or no faith in the remedies he suggests, is such an anomaly that it could not be believed were it not that we see examples day by day. Are not some young men destined for "the Church" because they are fit for nothing else? Do not some occupy their post simply as a sinecure? Nay, worse; have we not seen some hopeless moral cripples, some all but incurables, invested with the robes of office? In "Lycidas," Milton "takes occasion," as he says, to make some pertinent remarks on this subject. One can only wonder that in a profession so honourable, so responsible, the *esprit de corps* has not induced its members to take rather more stringent precautions against the admission to membership of unworthy candidates, and against the retention in their midst of those who have not fulfilled their trust. Were this done, there is no doubt that confidence in the profession would be much more wide-spread.

There is, moreover, such an individual as the moral "quack." I have seen him. He is to be avoided.

But although, owing to the high qualifications necessary, all cannot be moral physicians, there is still much that can be done, and that ought to be done, by all who wish to serve their fellows well. It is not straining the analogy too far to say that there is ambulance and nursing work to be done. Indeed, I have often seen "first aid" very efficiently rendered. Invaluable service, in the cause of righteousness, is done by influence and example, unstudied, but simply the outcome of the person's own moral health. Conscious example, influence purposely exerted,—these are very apt to fail utterly.

The sphere of helpfulness in the work of alleviating moral suffering and healing moral disease is such a wide one that all who will may find a place. The kingdom of righteousness is vast, without bounds, and the work to be done is infinitely varied. Whilst, therefore, those who wish to be of greatest use must learn what is to be learnt, that they may do what is to be done, the humbler offices may also be filled with honour.

> "Who best
> Bear His mild yoke, they serve Him best. His state
> Is kingly; thousands at His bidding speed,
> And post o'er land and ocean without rest.
> They also serve who only stand and wait."

CHAPTER V.

MORAL HYGIENE.

Part I.—Personal Hygiene.

Of late years, medical research has more and more taken the wise direction of the study of the prevention of disease. That "prevention is better than cure" is a truth so fundamental that its statement is now getting superfluous. And it evidently loses none of its appropriateness when applied to the subject of moral disease. Moral hygiene may, therefore, fittingly occupy our serious attention.

The first question to consider is: What are the fundamental characteristics of moral health? I should say they are strength, purity, honesty, and unselfishness.

Strength is the first condition of moral stability. A weak nature is always liable to go, or to be led, astray. At the best, the virtues exhibited by such a nature will be negative ones. As plastic

material on which to work, a strong nature, with its greater possibilities, both for good and for evil, is much to be preferred, for, properly handled, its capacities for usefulness are great. And if the sources of moral strength be analysed, it will be found that,

> "Self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control,
> These three alone lead life to sovereign power.
> Yet not for power (power of herself
> Would come uncalled-for), but to live by law,
> Acting the law we live by without fear;
> And, because right is right, to follow right
> Were wisdom in the scorn of consequence."

The first essential therefore is that there should be firmly implanted in the mind the conviction that the right should be followed for its own sake; and that once a certain course appears to be the right one, it is to be pursued, no matter who may oppose it or what may be the consequence.

The second great condition is purity. Let the ideal be as high as it can be framed; and let the motives for action be always the highest, never the lowest. To refrain from what is impure because it is unworthy and degrading will lead to the self-reverence above-mentioned. Once self-respect is lost, all other evils may be expected to follow. Whilst on the other hand, the preservation of self-

respect is a most powerful incentive to right. It is a source of strength. It is no idle boast that of Galahad,

> "My strength is as the strength of ten,
> Because my heart is pure."

It is rather a physiological fact. The secret, as well as the result, of purity is self-control. And no moral steadfastness can be expected of the man who gives way to every sensual desire (using the words in a wide sense) that may arise.

The third great condition is honesty; not the kind that is prompted by "best policy" considerations; nor such as arises from the wish to appear well in the sight of others; but honesty in one's own sight.

> "This above all: to thine own self be true,
> And it must follow, as the night the day,
> Thou canst not then be false to any man."

It may be safely said that, whatever errors a man may commit, from ignorance, from folly, or under the stress of sudden temptation, he can not become seriously morally diseased as long as he is at heart honest. Such honesty is like the strong constitution which will carry a man through much ill-health, and bring him out safely at the last.

For where such honesty exists, wrong-doing will invariably bring about that "godly sorrow which leads to repentance." Honesty readily sees through the shallow pretexts of sophistry; and the responsibility of sophistry for wrongful acts is great.

The fourth great condition is unselfishness. The selfish man may do the right as long as this is consistent with his interest; but sooner or later an occasion is sure to arise where his apparent interest lies in wrong-doing; he then yields, and in so doing, lays the reins on the neck of his inclination, and they will soon carry him to disaster. On the other hand, the unselfish man may, it is true, fall into all kinds of wrong which may be the outcome of weakness; but if he is at heart unselfish, he will see how largely his wrong-doing is harmful to others; and he will thus always have a powerful motive to keep to the right path.

These four characteristics are therefore at the basis of moral hygiene; and the efforts made to prevent moral disease should take the form, in great measure, of impressing these points on the still mouldable mind of the child.

And so, to those who have the training of children, the great object should be to secure the conditions of moral hygiene. Up to a certain time in the training of a child rules must of necessity

be laid down, and commands enforced, without explanation. But this principle must not be carried too far. The incessant laying down of rules, often absurdly trivial, has the effect of baffling the child's native moral sense. The reason of rules should be given. Otherwise, especially if the child has a strong individuality, he will very soon rebel against admonitions and restrictions dependent, apparently, simply on caprice. The system of rewards and punishments also has a limit to its usefulness. But if the child be taught that the rightness of an action is a quite sufficient reason for doing it; that certain things are to be avoided because they would conflict against his own nobility of character; that the approval of his own conscience is one of the most precious things that can be secured; and that the welfare of others is to be a ruling principle of the whole of life, with such ideas implanted in his mind, he will readily see why this or that thing is right or wrong; and he will always have a *motive* for the right.

As the child's manifold activities unfold he must be provided continually with proper outlets for his energies, for "idleness is chief mistress of vices all." And thenceforth this must hold throughout life. The man who has healthy subjects on which to exercise his thoughts, who has worthy ways in

which to busy his hands, is morally safeguarded in many respects. Let the child, therefore, be made to feel something of the seriousness of life, even through his mirth and happiness; a child's natural activity is well known; before he knows how to direct this activity into useful and profitable channels he will still be always busy. Idleness is absolutely unnatural in a healthy child. Nothing is easier than to turn these tendencies to good account, by teaching that idleness is a disgrace. Unfortunately, many grown-up children still require to be taught that to work is honourable. The life of a human being is wasted, it is a failure, unless such an one work and produce; and yet there are lords, ladies, and honourables, there are also plain men and women, to whom a definite serious life-work is a matter of scorn, it being a much surer sign of greatness to pass the time in pleasure and dilettantism, living by the work of others, than to work for one's daily bread, adding to the world's wealth or knowledge. Hence the *ennui* and sentimentalism that lead to debility physically, to hysteria mentally, and to instability morally, among the women of the land, and to shallow-brained dandyism and immorality among the men. Idleness is an insuperable obstacle to moral hygiene.

Undue rigidity in the training of a child is to be avoided just as much as undue laxity, or spoiling. Each extreme is apt to lead to moral weakness in some form. Rigidity commonly has the effect of a spring; once released, as it must be when the personal control of parents is removed, there will be a tendency to rebound in the direction of excess. Especially is this the case when the rigidity is capricious, artificial, or unnatural. But a rigidity which is consistent, and which is in harmony with the natural laws of mind and body is otherwise; its influence will be for good only, for it will maintain a sense of proportion, and will not treat trivial faults as though they were grave crimes.

The proper function of one who trains a child is essentially to guide. It is in no wise to break or to crush the early tendencies. If a child shows signs of a strong will, this should be a cause for rejoicing, for the *force* necessary to lead the child into right ways is already to hand. Does a parent or teacher propose to "break" a child's will? It is foolish and wrong. Foolish, because it is a waste of force; wrong, because, if successful, it will leave the child morally weak. Do not "break," rather "direct." If the child's inclinations be trained, diverted, in a healthy direction, then the whole reserve force of the child's will

helps to keep him in the right way. No natural endowment is given for the purpose of being crushed or mutilated. Self-annihilation is a crime against God and man. Let the endowments rather be utilised for good purposes; let the "self" be employed, turned to good account. Persistent crushing and restraining ends in moral idiocy, which may or may not be of the vicious type.

There is, perhaps, no sight more melancholy than that of a broken-winged, morally weak parent, struck with amazement in the contemplation of his child's vigorous moral activities, inanely trying to control the fledgeling's efforts to fly.

It yet remains to be realised by many that incapacity for training a child makes fatherhood a failure of trust, and so a reproach, instead of the highest honour to which a man can aspire.

Attempts are sometimes made to secure moral hygiene by maintaining a condition of "ignorance of evil." Up to a certain point this is not only an advantage; it is absolutely necessary. But within the precincts of even the purest and of the best-guarded home, the knowledge of evil must enter; no boy or girl, becoming a man or a woman, can remain ignorant of it. If no teaching on the subject be given, the only effect will be that the child will discover it for himself, and the process is

not devoid of danger. Unwarned of the nature and consequences of sin, the child will at first see evil only as a mystery, and from this mystery a glamour arises, which leads to wrong by, at first, almost imperceptible degrees. No advantage is to be gained from a personal experience that, for instance, "the bread of deceit is sweet to a man, but afterwards his mouth shall be filled with gravel." It is no advantage to a man that he should come to lead a pure life as the result of the loathing and disgust derived from satiety.

Shall a child be allowed to burn, to scar, it may be to disfigure himself, for the want of being told that fire burns? It is far better that teaching concerning evil be given by father and mother, not in the course of a scolding or a rebuke because of wrong done, but before the false step has been taken. Quite inconceivable to me is that false shame which restrains fathers and mothers from speaking to their children of the dangers that lie round about and in front of them, or which causes them to wrap up their words daintily in vague allusions and mysterious hints, by which, indeed, in many cases more harm is done than good. Teaching should, of course, be graduated to the child's developing powers and advancing knowledge; if given too early, it will not be under-

stood; if given too late, cure may be called for rather than prevention.

Hygiene comprises two departments: first, the care of the personal health; secondly, attention to the healthiness of the surroundings. In this chapter, I have so far discussed the former; and I must now say a few words on the subject of surroundings in relation to moral health. This much, however, it is well that we should keep in mind; that not on constitution alone, nor on surroundings alone, does health depend; but on the relationship between the two. And quite similarly, a man's moral health, that is to say, his character as shown in his actions, will be determined by the relation between the strength of his moral nature and the force of the temptations to which he is exposed. It is obvious, therefore, that the study of temptations is a most important part of the subject of moral hygiene, so much so, indeed, that I shall devote a separate chapter to its consideration.

CHAPTER VI.

MORAL HYGIENE.

Part II.—The Hygiene of Surroundings. Temptation.

MAN is so constituted that even were his moral surroundings ideally healthy, he would still be exposed to temptations "from within," or arising from his very nature. The healthiness of surroundings is therefore not all-sufficient; but it is still all-important, in order that the risks of moral disease may be reduced to a minimum.

Let us consider, for instance, the question of bodily want. The most important want is hunger. Hungry people are not necessarily worse, morally, than other people; simply for this reason, that they may have enough moral strength and self-control to say, "Better hunger, better even death, than disgrace and sin." But take a hundred average people, fifty of them hungry, and the rest not; all other conditions being equal, the moral tone of

the hungry ones will certainly be lower, and the likelihood of wrong actions will be greater, than among the others. It must necessarily be so, because hunger affects the whole disposition. No one would ask a favour of a hungry man, if he could wait till the man had dined. And, moreover, if a man who is hungry to the point of starvation come to me and say, "The first law I recognise is that I should live; I must and will eat, at any cost," I have no answer wherewith to convince him otherwise. Outside the confines of society, his claim would not be disputed. And within such confines, it should be an absolute impossibility that a man who is willing to work should lack food. It is not for me to discuss here social and poor-law economics; but the broad principle is one of fundamental justice and equity, and cannot be evaded. A society that is content that some of its members should go hungry, undeservedly, must expect a lowered standard of morality.

Hunger is but one want, and there are many others almost as important. It may be briefly stated that the first essential condition in a healthy environment is that there should be no undue want. Naturally, a man's wants vary with his capacities and circumstances; and as long as he does not fix his standard of necessaries unduly

high, he has a right to expect that a society whom he serves well should supply those necessaries.

Hence, those who go about seeking to supply the wants of their needy fellows are doing the best possible work in the cause of righteousness; they are going to the root of the matter, and fulfilling the primary conditions for securing the moral health of the community. The admonition, "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you," is the right one for the individual to apply to his own case; but in considering the case of others, the order must be reversed: "Seek first to add to thy fellow those things he requires, and then look in faith for righteousness."

In this connection, the influence of hunger, and of other kinds of want, on prostitution, is a subject well worth the consideration of all workers in the cause of social purity. This gigantic vice of our civilisation has, of course, many roots; but it cannot be doubted that want is one of these roots, and an important one; I dare affirm, without fear of contradiction, that if want were done away with, an immense decrease in this vice would at once follow. To preach purity to a starving "fallen woman" is about as futile as to preach honesty to a starving thief.

Another important matter is the influence of vicious surroundings on children. If a child be brought up in the home of a gang of swindlers, shall we expect this child to turn out honest? So, also, a respect for sobriety and temperance will be looked for in vain in a home of drunkards. Of supreme importance, therefore, is the rescue work carried on among children. Such work has assumed very large proportions of late; its increase in scope and efficiency must be the fervent desire of all the true-hearted, and is one of the best possible channels for their helping efforts.

Another direction in which true missionary work is urgently needed is the improvement of the accommodation of the poor, so as to prevent overcrowding. Most people who have lent a hand to help can speak of numerous instances in which they have seen one sleeping-room serve for a father and mother, and perhaps half-a-dozen children, more or less grown up. What standard of morality can be expected under such conditions? Nay, what standard is found? Often none at all. In a village known to me there is a row of some dozen of these hovels. The owner is a lady of some position and wealth, who gives largely to religious and other charities. The tenants made requests that the houses (!) should be enlarged, by throwing two

into one, offering to pay higher rents; there were no other houses in the village available for them. But the owner could see no reasonableness in these requests, and matters remained as they were. Was it a subject for wonder that, one after another, the young girls in these places "went to the bad"? And if a "settling of accounts" come one day, where will the responsibility lie?

It is clear from these considerations that one part of the duties of the "moral officer of health" is to secure healthy surroundings. And have "infectious diseases" no parallel in the realm of morals? Yes, truly.

There is nothing so contagious as bad example; it is even more potent than good example. It is a curious fact that suicide, for instance, often occurs in the form of epidemics. From of old this has been noticed. Among mobs an outbreak of savage cruelty has sometimes spread with an alarming swiftness; of this, histories of revolutions contain many examples. And this factor in life has to be reckoned with on a smaller scale.

Obviously "prevention" here must take the form, as much as possible, of removal of those we wish to protect from the influence of such bad examples. In a great measure this can be done. Yet there are limits. All who pass through the world must

necessarily come in contact with evil. Some are, by their very duties, especially so exposed. The only rule that can be laid down is that no unnecessary risks be run. To expose the young to the influence of evil, simply that they may "see the world," is no wise course. It will always be time enough when such exposure occurs inevitably in the course of the daily life, as it must, sooner or later. Many must "touch pitch"; that is no reason why they should be defiled. Everyone who has had to touch pitch has the opportunity of washing his hands, and can at least see that he does not carry it with him, to touch other people with it. In just the same way many doctors, nurses, and others, must at times come in contact with cases of fever; that is no reason why they should either take the disease themselves or carry it to others. There are such precautions as moral antiseptics to be used. And if a person, whose duty does not take him in contact with fever-cases, goes to visit such, in carelessness or bravado, he has only himself to blame if he fall ill. On the other hand, when duty so calls, no selfish considerations of personal safety should be allowed to interfere. Let him, however, who is called into contact with moral disease know his danger, and the danger to others, and exercise all reasonable care.

In the science of medicine there has been much research into the protective inoculation against disease. And this also has an application. Many persons who have had a slight attack of some moral complaint are "protected" in greater or lesser degree from subsequent attacks. But of deliberate inoculation of mild moral disease, to protect against severer forms, there is nothing to be said except this, that the proceeding is fraught with the greatest danger. Who shall gauge the dose to be inoculated? It must be remembered also that moral disease is fearfully progressive. Once started, its arrest can by no means be foretold. Whilst, therefore, the man who, by a comparatively slight slip has been warned from graver danger, may take to heart the salutary lesson and be thankful, this measure can *never* be recommended to the healthy. Let them keep their health intact, and also be thankful.

"How many a father have I seen,
A sober man, among his boys,
Whose youth was full of foolish noise,
Who wears his manhood hale and green:

"And dare we to this fancy give,
That had the wild oat not been sown,
The soil, left barren, scarce had grown
The grain by which a man may live?

" Or, if we held the doctrine sound
For life outliving heats of youth,
Yet who would preach it as a truth
To those that eddy round and round ?

" Hold thou the good ; define it well ;
For fear divine philosophy
Should push beyond her mark, and be
Procuress to the lords of hell ! "

TENNYSON—*In Memoriam.*

CHAPTER VII.

MORAL DIATHESES.

In medical language, "diatheses" are constitutional conditions which predispose to various diseases; thus, we speak of the rheumatic, the gouty, the consumptive, diathesis. It will be found that in moral pathology parallel conditions exist; as examples of which we may mention the emotional diathesis, the sensual diathesis, etc. In other words, there are various "moral temperaments," of whose nature and tendencies we must take account if we wish to form a really true idea of moral disease. Some of these we must consider in detail.

The Irritable Diathesis.—There are many most estimable people who are spoiled by the one characteristic of bad temper. If offended, they either sulk or they break out into violent passions; and in this state they are really not masters of themselves. That "anger is short madness" is physiologically true, for the main characteristic of

madness is loss of self-control, and this is exactly what is the matter with people in a passion. All considerations of reason, of logic, are thrown to the winds; the impulse of the moment is blindly followed; and words are said, actions are done, which may do the gravest harm; yet, while the person in a passion knows this, he is powerless to act otherwise. This condition must, of course, be regarded as a disease; indeed, it is not only a moral, it is also a physical disease. The physical counterpart to it is a nervous system which reacts immediately to outside influences; the restraining influence of deliberate thought is absent. In early life this tendency can be overcome, and in later life it can be diminished, by self-restraint. But if such self-restraint be not exercised the power of restraint becomes gradually less and less. The natural result in extreme cases is simply madness. Carpenter says, in his "Mental Physiology," that the superintendent of the Hanwell Lunatic Asylum informed him that two-thirds of the female lunatics in that institution found their way there through habitual indulgence in an originally bad temper. Bad temper is not commonly reckoned among the cardinal vices; but this is certain, that few faults have a worse influence on other people. It is a *chronic* moral disease, and is therefore always

serious. Like other chronic diseases, one of its main dangers is this, that it may lead, through acts of violence, to all kinds of other disasters. In extreme cases it has been responsible for murders; but in many less serious directions its effects are also disastrous. Life-long enmities, bitter strifes, the severing of friendships, have arisen at times from an outburst of temper; whilst less prominent but even more enduring harm has been done by repeated cruel and cutting words. It is therefore of the utmost importance that persons afflicted with this complaint should realise something of its possible results.

At the same time it is advisable that we reflect, from time to time, that this condition may arise from causes which demand almost as much pity as blame. Many people are hasty, irritable, as the result of chronic ill-health; whilst with others the cause may lie in constant worry, overwork, and the pressure of arduous and unfavourable conditions of life. With others, again, it is a legacy derived by inheritance from their parents. But while we should be ready to make all possible excuses for such a habit of mind, it should ever be remembered how serious the consequences of this habit may be. For persons who have the irritable diathesis, the proper course is, obviously, not to

excuse themselves on the ground of their infirmities, but to make up their minds that they will overcome it. We shall have more to say on this subject when we come to consider it in more detail.

The Sensual Diathesis.—This, like the preceding, depends largely on the want of self-control. But it is in other directions that this want of self-control is felt. Here the gratification of the senses makes a constant demand on the person's nature, and it has, like the other, a physiological basis. Such physiological basis is, as may be expected, very complex. The various senses in these cases react readily to impressions from without; it may be the sense of taste for food or drinks; or it may be the sexual sense; whilst the mental attitude towards sensations so derived must be taken into account. One feature of this mental attitude is a more or less constant "craving" for sense-excitement; so that the three prominent features of this diathesis on the physical side are,—the constancy of the craving; the inability to repress the craving; and the want of control of the degree in which the craving is indulged. Hereditary causes play a large part in the production of the sensual diathesis; whilst it has the further characteristic of being essentially progressive. That is to say,

every indulgence paves the way for further indulgence.

In some cases it may take other directions than those spoken of above ; it may take the form of a craving for pleasure, leading principally to a frivolous view of life, and the neglect of serious and steady work.

Its effects are disastrous, not so much to other people (as in the case of the irritable diathesis) as to the individual concerned. It brings in its train a general blunting of the moral sense, and the loss of self-respect ; and, as was pointed out in an earlier chapter, the loss of self-respect means the loss of one of the strongest safeguards against moral disease. At the same time, its secondary effects are bad for other people, for society is so co-ordinated that if one member suffer others must also suffer in some degree. It must be remembered that I am not now considering the effects of isolated sins of self-indulgence, in whatever form ; the effect of such is often most disastrous to other people. These will have to be discussed later. At present I am concerned only with diathesis, that is, with the general tendency to a particular class of faults and vices; and speaking from this point of view, the evil consequences of the sensual diathesis fall principally on the person suffering from it.

The distinction in this respect between the sensual and the irritable diathesis is well-marked; the former is essentially subjective; it can be active, without involving other people in any way. On the other hand, the irritable diathesis is mainly objective, for it is in the man's relations to other people that his irritability is shown. When he is alone his irritability is only potential; it is not active.

It is no part of my purpose to seek to excuse acts of sensuality; but in regarding the matter philosophically and critically, it should be remembered that the person with a sensual diathesis is considerably handicapped in the moral race; nor should his continual efforts to overcome his "besetting sin" be overlooked, when he is being judged.

The Emotional Diathesis.—The craving for emotional excitement, the undue exercise of emotional activity, and a tendency to act upon the impulse of the moment—these are the characteristics of the emotional diathesis. It is fostered by the reading of sensational novels, especially at the time when the emotional nature is developing, that is, in youth. It causes an unhealthy view of life and its duties; the unostentatious performance of the daily work has no attractions; instead,

life becomes a dreamy vision of air-castles, full of picturesque situations in which the dreamer always figures as the hero of a romance. It is due to over-stimulation of the emotional side of the mind, at the expense of the practical and the reflective faculties; whilst on the moral side there is distortion. Thus an elopement which has nothing rational to recommend it is invested with the alluring colours of a sacrifice made at the call of love; a life of piracy and brigandage appears in the guise of a noble knight-errantry. From this condition to the delusions of undoubted insanity is sometimes only a short step. But the issue takes sometimes a quite different direction; and the dreamer may awake to the sober realities of life, alone, without resources, without a training that will serve even to earn the daily bread; and sometimes with a sense of having been betrayed. This is the kind of man who acquires the reputation of being "no man's enemy but his own"; never pausing to consider, the momentary emotion holds supreme sway, and he acts on every impulse that arises. Blown about by every wind of opinion and of feeling, his life is a perpetual vacillation; unstable as water, he effects no lasting good. Instability of thought involves instability of conduct also, whilst his friends frame for him

the feeble excuse that "he means well." Analysing, as in the case of other diatheses, the relative harm which such a constitution does to its owner and to other people, it is evident that the former greatly preponderates. At the same time it is always a loss to society to have a useless and blundering member. On society, therefore, a duty devolves, to check the development of this diathesis. Few other diatheses yield so readily to proper treatment at the proper time.

The Indolent Diathesis.—This temperament has reference to action rather than to feeling, although in its production feeling also has a share. When one has a feeling of *bien-aise,* of comfort in the condition of the moment, it is natural that one should not wish to change the condition; in this there is nothing pathological. It becomes pathological, unhealthy, when the sense of bodily comfort is allowed to cause neglect of the call of duty. Furthermore, duty may call to other activities than the bodily. It may demand thought, mental and moral effort, for these are essential to growth and to usefulness. To such calls the man of indolent diathesis pays no heed, but "stagnates in the weeds of sloth." He does not very often "do the things which he ought not to do," for that would involve trouble; his moral

obliquity consists in "leaving undone the things which he ought to have done." We may emphasize, in passing, the distinction between the lazy man and the idle man. The former has work to do which he neglects; he is of the indolent diathesis. But the idle man has not work to do, and, if we may credit the fathers of a former age, the devil finds some for him, not of the best. Of course the two conditions may exist together; by reason of continued inactivity, the lazy man may bring himself to the condition of idleness—of having no work to do; and he may pass on to the third stage, *viz.*, incapacity for work. Evidently we have to do here with a process of degeneration, leading to the production of that anomalous blot upon society, the parasite. Parasites are of various kinds; we have, for example, the religious, the intellectual, and the social parasite. The degenerative process is the same in all three. The religious parasite has been described by Professor Drummond in his "Natural Law in the Spiritual World" in such a graphic manner, and in such graceful language, that I should like to advise my readers to study it. It does not fall within the scope of the present work, which has to do rather with the social and the moral side of the matter.

Like those of any other unhealthy moral

temperament, the man with the indolent diathesis has at first a call upon our pity. But the remedy lies so largely in his own hands, especially at first, that if he allows himself to degenerate into an invertebrate parasite, he is not entitled to much besides blame. In the earlier stages of degeneration he is useless, but comparatively harmless; later, owing to the disuse and dulling of the moral sense, he may also do harm, by his bad example, by hindering the work of others, and by the readiness with which he transgresses the moral law. Though arising from a different cause, the effects are very similar to those described as resulting from the diathesis which we have to consider next.

The Morally Obtuse Diathesis.—There are some persons with a moral sense so keen that any departure, however slight, from the moral law fills them with a remorse which gives them no peace. There are others, on the contrary, of a morally obtuse diathesis, to whom the distinctions between right and wrong are but slight; a wrong action causes them but little trouble, and they pass on serenely from one wrong to another. The condition is parallel to that which is found in the medical world, of people who never feel deeply on anything, to whom even bodily pain is not as painful

as to other people. Such a diathesis, in the moral as in the physical sphere, marks a low stage of development. The harmful effects of this temperament may be many and great; because, whenever temptation comes, the probability is that the person will yield. A distinction must be drawn between those who, knowing well the difference between good and evil, yield through weakness of will, and those who sin through ignorance. To the latter the question often does not even occur whether a thing is right or wrong; they only discover that it is wrong when they begin to suffer from the consequences of it. Their stock answer to reproofs is, "I did not think." Like the person of weak intellect, they often call for more pity than blame, on the part of those who are trying to judge of their motives. Just as there are gradations from the condition of intellectual weakness to that of idiocy, so many degrees of moral obtuseness are found. Its most pronounced types are the simple-minded people who are employed as tools, as "cat's paws," by the unscrupulous. A watchful society, anxious to preserve its members from harm, will often have to pay special attention to this very point; and keep a sharp look-out on unscrupulous plotters, to save the simple-minded from their hands. It is well also to remember that obtuseness

may sometimes be feigned, as a mere artifice, by people who are really quite capable of discerning moral evil, and of seeing the results of it. But in cases where this diathesis really exists, it must be treated with a certain gentle consideration, and remedied, as far as may be, by education.

The Hyper-sensitive Diathesis.—This is the opposite of the preceding. Some may say, "But surely it is impossible to be too sensitive on moral matters!" On the contrary, there is such a thing as moral hyperæsthesia. In medical language we call a person "hyperæsthetic" who feels all ordinary conditions much too keenly; with such a person an ordinary touch, an ordinary brightness of light, may be absolutely painful. Clearly, such a condition is detrimental to a healthy life; it really amounts to disease.

Moral hyperæsthesia, also, may amount to disease. Such a person will work himself up into a fever of anxiety and self-reproach over, it may be, a mere hasty word, already forgotten by the person to whom it is addressed. Under the influence of certain kinds of religious teaching, the hyperæsthetic man may torture himself continually with the apprehension that he has committed "the unpardonable sin"; or that he has "fallen from grace." He is apt to waste his time and strength

deploring the consequences of a wrong act, when he would be much better employed in making amends for the same, simply resolving to be more on his guard on a future occasion. The ultimate result of this diathesis is a condition of moral hypochondriasis. If any argument were necessary to prove that this is a diseased moral condition, I should simply point to the large part which it plays in filling our lunatic asylums. Moral hyperæsthesia is in its essence too introspective: the sufferer dwells as morbidly on the working of his inner moral nature as the confirmed dyspeptic dwells on that of his stomach. As one might expect, it is found more often among women than among men; for, broadly speaking, women are naturally more morally sensitive than men. Although this diathesis may underlie the whole of an individual's life, it is apt to show itself more markedly in youth and in old age than in middle life. In youth its effects are perhaps the most serious, especially at the time when manhood and womanhood are developing out of childhood. Under its influence many things, in themselves of little importance, arising out of the unfolding of physical powers, are magnified till they assume exorbitant dimensions; and, with the help of ignorance, the mind passes into an utterly disquiet condition,

which may undermine the health and unfit for work. It is then that the harpies who prey upon the fears and ignorance of the young reap their harvest; it is then that unscrupulous confessors may obtain and hold an unwarrantable sway over the young mind. Briefly, this is the happy hunting-ground for quacks of all descriptions. Further, the moral hyperæsthetic and the moral hypochondriac are apt to lose, in greater or less degree, the self-respect and the self-confidence which are so necessary to a righteous and a useful life. The harmful effects of this diathesis expend themselves almost entirely on the individual concerned. It is quite clear that such a disposition requires to be guarded and guided with the utmost care. The dispelling of ignorance and superstition will be one of the main duties of the moral physician. He will not try to lower ideals of right; but he will point out that to fall short of such ideals is no reason for despair.

"What keeps a spirit wholly true
To that ideal which it bears?
What record? Not the stainless years
That breathed beneath the Syrian blue.

"Then fret not, like an idle girl,
That life is dashed with flecks of sin.
Abide. Thy wealth is gathered in
When Time hath sundered shell from pearl."

CHAPTER VIII.

EGOISM.

WHEN thinking over the subject of diatheses, I included among them, at first, the "egoistic diathesis." But it soon became evident that in "Egoism" we have to deal with something of a different nature. If the dispositions to particular classes of offences, considered in the preceding chapter, are analogous to diatheses in the medical world, such as the tubercular, the rheumatic, and the neurotic diatheses, then may egoism be compared to that heritage of liability to all kinds of ill which "flesh" has received from generations gone by. In general, egoism is the root of all evil. The few exceptions may be compared to those accidental injuries in daily life which no diathesis can prepare us to expect, or lead us to prepare for. Egoism is an underlying condition of all the moral diatheses previously described. But, besides, it can, when unduly developed, give rise to its own particular train of moral complaints, and greater and lesser

degrees of ill-health. This dual characteristic gives it a special importance, and I shall now proceed to its separate consideration.

In discussing the nature of moral disease, I said that most sins are the negative aspect of certain qualities of which the positive aspect are virtues. This holds good of egoism. The positive or healthy side of egoism demands a few words; so that we have to consider in succession three grades or degrees of egoism:—

1. Egoism rightly developed; a factor for good.
2. The egoism that underlies various forms of moral disease.
3. Egoism of unhealthy tumour-like growth, overshadowing the whole life.

That egoism may be right and essential to moral health is perhaps a doctrine opposed to the view which some take, that the first step towards righteousness is "self-annihilation." Nevertheless, I hold the doctrine true. It is but a low ideal that a man's life should be a negation of wrong; let it rather be an affirmation of right. Self-annihilation may result in a life that is "not wrong"; self-preservation and the use of self for noble ends, will produce a life of positive right. This is the more

difficult path; it involves continuous effort and strife, with an ever-accompanying liability to failure and defeat. But it is also the path of achievement, of true moral health. The "self" must be kept well in hand; it must not be master, but servant. But, as a servant, there is none better. All good work, socially, intellectually, morally, depends on self-reliance; it requires courage, patience, determination; ambition and enthusiasm (of the quiet sort) are its very atmosphere. And all these virtues are essentially egoistic. But their egoism is subordinated to higher aims. The pioneers of progress have ever been strong, self-sufficient men; they have had the conviction that their course (or cause) was right; by the sheer force of individuality they have often overcome obstacles and opposition; and the secret of their success was egoism consecrated to a noble work. In such consecration egoism finds its absolution, nay, its transformation into one of the highest virtues. We need not dwell on this; the essence of the whole matter can be very shortly stated: self as an end and aim is unhealthy egoism; self as a means to others' good is the most enlightened altruism.

Egoism in the second degree underlies, as I have said, all the unhealthy moral diatheses previously

considered; but it does more. It leads to all kinds of impulsive wrong actions, by which I mean actions to which there is no special natural predisposition. The impulses to self-gratification spring from numerous sources, ranging from the lowest to the highest elements of man's nature. On the lowest level we find the gratification of the physical senses; passing upwards, there is a whole series of emotions ready to be ministered to; even the highest emotions, the religious, may call for and receive unhealthy stimulus. Still higher, in the intellectual planes of thought, cravings solicit indulgence: cravings for admiration, fame, social distinction, riches or power. In all these forms self-gratification for self's sake is unhealthy, and the means employed for this purpose are very apt to pass from those which are, in themselves, right, to those which are intrinsically and in every way wrong. Consider it well. There is no wrong done to our fellow-man that has not its origin in some effort for self-gratification, just as there is no wrong self-inflicted that has not a similar origin. I have not enumerated the moral diseases which so arise; to do so would be to pass under review all the diseases in our moral nosology or nomenclature of disease. In many the underlying selfishness is not at first apparent, but a very brief consideration

will make it clear. For instance, cruelty is fundamentally due to a wish to gratify a sense of enjoyment of physical power; the thirst for revenge, or for triumph over an enemy's defeat may be superadded; whilst in lower natures there is probably a sense of brutality as real as that of hunger, which at times demands satisfaction. Of any other wrong act we might make a similar analysis; nor is it a matter of surprise that, with our so complex nature, the motives of self-gratification should be also frequently complex. In the case of the majority of wrong actions the selfishness to which they are due comes out perfectly clearly, for example, in miserliness and in vanity; indeed, these come to be regarded simply as varying manifestations of egoism.

We pass on now to the consideration of the third degree of egoism, when it saturates a man's whole life, and entitles him to be regarded as, above all, an egoist.

It must not be supposed that everybody can become a true egoist. Certain qualifications are necessary, for an egoist subsists on self-esteem and on the praise of others. There must be, therefore, something estimable about him, something praiseworthy. A good physique and personal beauty are, if not essential, yet very valuable. The egoist will

not necessarily take credit to himself for these possessions, but they will enable him to compare himself favourably with those round about him, and will certainly win for him a certain admiration. He must have mental qualities which will cause him to shine in an average society, and secure for him a succession of triumphs. And lastly, in his moral relations, though he may not have much intrinsic moral worth, there must be a good appearance before the world. These are the ingredients out of which the egoistic character is built up. If a man does not possess qualities up to, or even above, the average, he will soon find, whatever his own opinion of himself, that he is not appreciated, that he is overshone by others. Such a lesson in humility strikes at the very roots of egoism. If his personal vanity is very strong, the egoist may dwell chiefly on his superior points, and persuade himself that qualities in which he does not excel are scarcely worth the having. But this is not generally the case with the first-class egoist, for he is sensitive, even morbidly hyper-sensitive, and shrivels under derision and evident contempt. Clearly then, the egoist is, as a rule, an otherwise admirable character, marred by his egoism. To those who see into and through him, the admirable qualities may not appeal; these

are forgotten, overshadowed by the obtrusive capital I. But the moral philosopher and physician, who is trying to survey impartially this patient's case, must recognise his good as well as his bad points.

The egoist's attitude is one of self-worship. When alone, he bows before this shrine, burning the incense of an approving and appreciative conscience. In other people he sees the same image. He does not read and understand his friends. He sees in them but the reflection of himself. He does not love, but he loves to be loved.

His actions are framed by his attitude. The test of any moral question is not, Is it right? but, Will it appear right? He is generous and kind, according to his means, not for the love of doing good, but because happy, contented faces are necessary to his peace of mind, and he loves to be styled a benefactor. His private life is correct, because any other course would be undignified, and would involve unpleasant feelings. Like the old Pharisees, who partook largely of his nature, the "outside of the cup and platter" is always presentable; it is in the realms of motive that he is so diseased. If the matter ended here, he would probably do no great harm, and could only be regarded with mingled pity and contempt. But

it is the fate of egoism to be found out and exposed; and in the efforts to ward off this exposure the egoist, having no true moral sense to guide him, gradually sinks into debasement. His very endowments pave the way to self-discovery; and then the hypocrisy, at first unconscious, becomes conscious and scheming. In the feverish effort to patch up a fading reputation and maintain a certain outward appearance of worth, he sinks more and more in the sloughs of meanness and depravity, until, baffled and desperate, he loses the last traces of self-respect, and becomes a manifest moral wreck. Happy for him if in this headlong downward course he has not compromised himself in the eyes of the law, and can simply sink into obscurity; but probabilities are against him. If he can but bury himself in this obscurity, his salvation may there begin. Alone and forsaken, he may see the secret of his failure. Starting afresh, upon a basis of humility, the elements of worth which contributed to his downfall will help to raise him again, and he may prove,

> "That men may rise on stepping-stones
> Of their dead selves to higher things."

Yet even in view of such a happy consummation, how can we do other than regret, on the lowest

grounds, the waste of power and usefulness in such a life? The good ultimately achieved, when compared with the initial possibilities, appears as failure. Besides which, there remains to be taken into account all the harm done to others in the process. With great weight, therefore, comes the old injunction which goes to the very root of the whole matter, "Let no man think of himself more highly than he ought to think."

The type of "the egoist" is well known, but nowhere has it been presented more powerfully, more convincingly, in all its phases, than in Mr. Meredith's book of that name; nowhere has its inevitable consummation been traced more faithfully, and I feel I cannot more fittingly close this chapter than by referring to it such of my readers as have not yet become acquainted with it.

CHAPTER IX.

DIAGNOSIS.

A PHYSICIAN'S first duty towards a patient is to arrive at a diagnosis of the ailment from which that patient is suffering. He has to discover what actually is the matter, not simply what seems to be the matter. Thus the complaint is, for instance, headache; but this is only a symptom, a consequence of something else; we will suppose, for example, indigestion. If he tries to cure the headache, without finding out that it is due to indigestion, he will very probably fail. Consequently much of his success depends upon his skill in diagnosis. In the case of moral disease a proper diagnosis is equally important.

Many people boast of their ability to read character by "first impressions." The boast is not, however, of much value. I much prefer the attitude of the man or woman who reserves judgment. True, first impressions may be, and often are,

correct; just as a physician may at once form a correct opinion, from a superficial glance, that a person has heart-disease, or is paralysed; just as a surgeon also may give one look and rightly suppose that a man has a broken leg. But in these things there is no great merit, and, indeed, even these first impressions are not always right. Similarly, if a man is seen swaying across the pavement and heard talking incoherently, it may fairly be assumed that he is tipsy; but the inference that he is a drunkard may be quite wrong. And the more complex a man's mental and moral nature is, the less is it likely that any person, however sagacious, will form a correct first impression about him. The admonition not to judge by appearances is much more widely known than practised; and hence much injustice. So I lay stress on the maxim, "Suspend judgment."

Evidently the diagnosis of moral disease is not a matter that concerns the moral physician alone. It is not everyone's duty to treat moral disease; but all must of necessity form opinions respecting the character of people they meet in the daily life. And not only for the sake of justice to the persons criticised, but also for the sake of the welfare and peace of mind of the critics, I repeat and urge, "Suspend judgment."

How is the diagnosis of a person's moral condition to be made? In the first place, we shall have some facts before us, as to something done or said; that is to say, some wrong action either spoken or done. Supposing this to be a lie or a theft, we are not to conclude at once that the person is untruthful or dishonest; we must ascertain what was the cause of the wrong. We must, in short, inquire concerning the motive, and this may itself have been either good or bad. If the motive was good, this does not make the action right; but it will show us something more of the person's moral condition, and we may find that ignorance is partly responsible. Or, if the motive was bad, it will again give a clue to character; for instance, the wrong may have been prompted by cowardice or revenge. Working backwards still, we may discover some antecedent wrong which led to the one we know of. The lie may have arisen from a cowardly fear of the exposure of an act of excess or brutality; the theft may have been a form of revenge for a reproof on account of laziness. We thus discover that the lie is really an outcome of a sensual or irritable diathesis; an indolent diathesis may have formed the basis of the theft. The diagnosis in the first case will be "sensuality or bad temper, prompting, through cowardice, an impulsive

act, namely a lie"; in the second case, "laziness leading incidentally to malice, with theft as an expression of that malice." If the person is to be taken in hand for treatment, the original wrong is that which really calls for attention.

The above is a comparatively simple and straightforward case for diagnosis; in other cases the complexity of motives and a long chain of wrong actions may make diagnosis difficult. We shall then require something more to enable us to come to a conclusion, namely the person's previous history. To obtain this we must proceed carefully. The first requisite is to feel and show sympathy. If you can convince a wrong-doer that you are really concerned about him, and wish to help him, he will as a rule, if he feels he can trust you, reveal himself to you without much reserve. Now, to obtain a patient's confidence not only greatly assists in forming a diagnosis, it goes a long way towards successful treatment.

On the other hand, a cold superiority, not unmingled with contempt, is the surest way to close and seal up a person's heart. Contempt, indeed, should never have any place; it is only in dealing with blind egoism that it has any value at all, and not always then. The earnest helper of the morally sick will be too noble and too conscious of his own

shortcomings to despise the fallen; like King Arthur, of whom Guinevere said,

> "but he never mocks,
> For mockery is the fume of little hearts."

The dominating feeling must ever be pity; not of the condescending, but of the sympathetic kind. Scorn and sarcasm are occasionally effective in dealing with arrogant self-sufficiency; yet even here, be it remembered, that the arrogance and defiance may be the recoil of a sensitive spirit against a cruel touch or heartless word. But when face to face with one smarting under the pangs of an inward remorse, and perhaps also of much mental and physical suffering caused by previous transgression, an unsympathetic assumption of contemptuous superiority is as cruel and as out of place as would be the action of a surgeon who should needlessly probe and tear open a tender wound requiring only soothing oil and healing balm.

I have felt it necessary to define, at some length, the mental attitude to be adopted by one who wishes to inquire into the past history of a moral patient; for I have seen much harm done by the official and officious heaping up of anathemas and heartless texts upon the heads of those who were

suffering acutely in spirit, mind and body, from their previous transgressions.

The information derived from the past history is often invaluable; it may show a deficient or distorted training; it may reveal a long series of disappointments and discouragements which have led up to the present condition. It may show that the very start in life, in the form of inherited tendencies and early associations, has been of the nature of a serious handicap. Obviously in forming a judgment these things must be taken into account, just as they must largely influence the line of treatment adopted.

We shall learn also, by a careful diagnosis, whether the patient is suffering from an acute or a chronic disease; in other words, whether the wrong action we are considering is a part and parcel of the whole tenor of the person's moral life, or whether it is to be regarded as an isolated incident, for which a knowledge of the person's character would not have prepared us, and which is not specially likely to recur. This has a direct bearing on the subject of prognosis to be dealt with in the next chapter, under which head we shall also have to consider the relative gravity and import of acute and chronic moral diseases. Here I content myself with saying that it is by a man's average

moral tone that we must judge of his health, and not by his acute attacks of disease at rare intervals. It may at times happen that a knowledge of the past history and the present condition of the patient will not allow us to come to a definite conclusion about him; just as in the early stages of certain fevers it is impossible to say what kind of fever we have to deal with. We must then be prepared to wait for future developments. It sometimes requires a little moral courage to say, "I do not know what is the matter; I must wait and see." But the honesty of this course will always be appreciated by those whose appreciation is of value. The conclusion I urge is, therefore, still this, "Suspend judgment."

It is well that the possible fallacies in forming conclusions be borne always in mind. A natural reserve or shyness leads many people to give unconsciously an unfavourable appearance to their actions; it may produce a manner that is *gauche*, abrupt, rude, casual, flippant, or inane. On the contrary, the manner may give a much better impression than the actual character warrants. A man's account of his own virtues is not always to be trusted; and when a man contends largely and loudly for "principles," it is well to consider how far his "interests" are involved. Further, the

manner may be consciously assumed, to veil that which is behind; in this case the best side is generally placed outermost, as the best apples in a barrel are placed at the top. But not always. Thus, Browning,

> " Shall I sonnet-sing you about myself ?
> Do I live in a house you would like to see ?
> Is it scant of gear, has it store of pelf ?
> ' Unlock my heart with a sonnet key ? '
>
> " Invite the world, as my betters have done ?
> ' Take notice : this building remains on view,
> Its suites of reception every one,
> Its private apartment and bedroom, too ;
>
> " ' For a ticket, apply to the Publisher.'
> No ; thanking the public I must decline.
> A peep through my window, if folk prefer ;
> But, please you, no foot over threshold of mine."

Another fallacy arises sometimes from the surroundings in which a person is first seen, and which may have the effect of bringing out his worst or his best points, as the case may be. A merchant's true character is not often seen on 'Change; nor a preacher's in the pulpit; nor any ordinary person's when out in society. To form a true estimate of a man, and a correct diagnosis of his moral condition, apart from such revelation of himself as he may voluntarily make, he must be

seen under varying conditions, and chiefly in his own home, when restraints and appearances are in some measure at least laid aside. Even the physical appearance of a person cannot be truly estimated on the stage, in the ball-room, or even in the street.

If the discernment of anyone's faculties and qualities, physical and mental, is difficult and liable to fallacies, can it be wondered at that the diagnosis of the most complex part of him, his moral health, is also a difficult and delicate matter? On all grounds I reiterate and emphasize the burden of this chapter, "Suspend judgment."

CHAPTER X.

PROGNOSIS.

By "prognosis" we understand the forecast of the course and result of a disease from which a person is suffering. To the patient the question, Shall I recover? is of vital interest; to his friends it is almost equally important. Such a forecast will depend upon the gravity of the disease itself, and upon the severity of the attack in the case under consideration; it will be influenced further by the patient's constitution and previous mode of life. All this applies equally to the prognosis of moral disease.

Speaking broadly, acute physical diseases are serious in proportion as they may lead to an immediate fatal issue; whilst in chronic complaints a permanent invalidism is chiefly to be feared, with the liability to further attacks. In the case of moral disease, the parallel fortunately fails in one respect: no acute attack is grave enough to lead to

moral death. Whether such a thing as moral death exists, may be a matter of opinion. Within the range of this present physical life, I believe there is no moral death, although we may see cases of coma, or profound insensibility, closely resembling it. And where such coma exists, it has always come on as a sequel of chronic, never of acute, disease. So also, acute moral disorders may leave a person weak; but it is the chronic conditions, the unhealthy diatheses, which leave him crippled, disfigured, or partly paralysed. It may therefore be stated generally, that unhealthy moral diatheses are ever more serious than acute disorders.

When I say "more serious," I mean as regards the person's condition, not as regards his reputation. A single lapse into intemperance, a single violation of the law of chastity, will generally do more to tarnish a person's reputation, however fair his moral life may otherwise be, than a life-long exhibition of bad temper. This is the judgment of society; and it is a false judgment. For the one is caused by a temporary, whilst the other is due to a permanent, loss of self-control as regards the fault concerned. And if the two conditions be compared according to their bad effect upon other people, the chronic disease is again much the more serious. The single fall, moreover, is likely to lead

to that "godly sorrow which leads to repentance" and to reformation; whilst the bad-tempered man thinks (if he thinks at all) that it is a small thing, "a little failing," of which indeed he may be rather proud. For most people are rather tender towards their little failings, as being characteristic of themselves. The result is that our chronic invalid is seldom remorseful; he may feel a passing regret, but it is not of such a kind as to lead to reform. What I have said of these two types, one an acute disorder and the other a chronic disease, applies generally; and a man who has stolen a loaf of bread may be more morally healthy than the magistrate who sentences him to a month's imprisonment. This, I repeat, may not be the verdict of society; but society does not lay claim to any special knowledge of moral disease.

The gravity of an unhealthy diathesis depends, therefore, on the greater liability of its possessor to repeated outbreaks of disease; and by a natural physiological law, every attack paves the way for its successor; whilst a progressive weakening or or even paralysis of the moral sense results.

It is, however, true of acute moral disorders also, that the second fall is easier than the first; and by repetition chronic disease may result. A man who has had an attack of rheumatic fever may

never have another; on the other hand, if conditions be favourable, one attack may follow the other till he becomes a rheumatic cripple. So also a man who has been once tipsy may remain sober ever after; or he may become afflicted with the sensual diathesis. Some diseases, such as ague, render sufferers from them specially liable to recurrence; and there is a similar diversity among moral diseases in their tendency to become chronic. These considerations must be borne in mind in forming a prognosis in any individual case.

I said that the prognosis will be influenced by the patient's constitution and previous mode of life. Thus a man of good average moral tone is less likely to suffer permanent harm from any particular wrong action than a man who is not accustomed to self-control. So, also, a man of education and refined sensibilities will feel more humiliated by an exhibition of intemperance than one of grosser mould; and by this very humiliation will be in some measure fortified against a repetition of his error. If, then, we meet with the disease in a chronic form affecting such an one, our prognosis will be correspondingly grave, because we shall see greater evidence of moral degradation. This consideration applies also in judging of the gravity of an isolated act of wrong; for whilst an unpremedi-

tated error, on the part of one whose previous moral health was good, is likely to be followed by contrition, and is consequently less serious, a deliberate act, on the other hand, is serious in proportion to the person's knowledge of right and capacity to do the right. But sins that are due to ignorance lead one to form a favourable prognosis.

There are also degrees of wrong. An outburst of temper is not, in itself, so grave as a theft; a forgery is not so serious as a murder. This kind of distinction is in a measure recognised by the law; and the severity of its punishments varies accordingly. Revenge intended is not so wrong as revenge achieved, for motive is not the only test of wrong; and any evil that has reached the stage of thought only, whether it be a lie, a robbery, an excess, an unkindness or any other evil, does not mark and scar the moral nature as does such a thought translated into action, nor does it pave the way, as does the latter, for a repetition of a similar offence.

Briefly, we may sum up, that no case of moral disease is ever to be regarded as hopeless; and in making a prognosis or forecast of the result, based on the gravity of the disorder, we must take into account its nature, whether acute or chronic, its intrinsic seriousness, the degree of falling short of

the individual's own standard, the danger to others, and the previous history of the patient, in so far as this affords indications of his average moral tone.

Finally, however grave the case may appear, it is the duty of the moral physician to always adopt a hopeful attitude in the presence of the patient.

CHAPTER XI.

THE CAUSATION OF MORAL DISEASE.

IN this chapter I propose to discuss the influence upon moral disease of certain conditions of life; for whilst selfishness may be said to be the immediate cause of all sin, there are circumstances which will often determine the nature of the wrong done in any particular case.

The factors whose influence requires special study are: heredity, age, sex, education, social position, opportunity, condition of mind, and condition of body.

Heredity.—That this plays a leading part in the development of some forms of moral ill-health is a fact well known; but we must at the outset draw a certain distinction. Inasmuch as children are, in the great majority of instances, brought up in the home of their parents, qualities which are due to heredity are apt to be confused with those which are really due to early surroundings. This will cause us to make some deduction

from the influence of heredity. But after the deduction has been made there remains a residue; and this view is confirmed by the consideration of those cases where children have been separated from their parents at a very early age, and yet show qualities characteristic of their parents.

Sometimes the inheritance takes the form of a direct tendency to a particular vice, and we may then regard it as a case of transmission of the corresponding moral diathesis. The period at which this diathesis becomes manifest will in part depend on the time of development of the bodily, mental, or emotional faculties with which the kind of wrong is specially associated; or it may be precocious, or delayed, according as the diathesis is transmitted in its full vigour, or is tending to become weaker in successive generations. The general rule, however, is that the inherited characteristic appears at about the same age as it appeared in the parent; in this respect it accords with a prevalent law of heredity.

It may be that whilst the diathesis is the same in parent and child, its particular form varies. Thus, the sensual diathesis may appear as lust in the one, and as intemperance in the other; or the indolent diathesis, revealed in the parent by a foolish indulgence, may take the direction, in the

child, of physical laziness. Or the inheritance may consist, not of a specific moral diathesis, but of a mental or bodily weakness, pre-disposing to moral disease by deficiency of will-power, or by a want of physical vigour.

For the student of moral pathology there are two corollaries to be drawn from the influence of heredity. Firstly, that he should recognise the extent to which this influence handicaps its subject in the battle with the wrong, whereby a due leniency will be exercised in forming judgment. Secondly, that he recognise the serious responsibility, for himself and for others, of handing down an unhealthy tendency to the generations that are to come after.

Age.—The influence of age is so obvious that I need not dwell on it at any great length. As I have said before, an individual's possibilities for evil are proportionate to his bodily, mental, and emotional powers. In youth, sins are often impulsive, the result of want of control arising from undeveloped or insufficient reflection. Greed, uncontrolled temper, destructiveness, thoughtless cruelty, deception due to fear, and mean, petty wrongs, are those we expect to find in the child as in the barbarian. On the other hand, in the adult we find more especially sins of excess, deliberate and

calculated wrongs, studied deceit, systematic fraud, and the egoism that depends on intellectual development. If we find an adult sinning in a foolish, childish way, with little apparent object, and betraying a contemptible littleness, we regard it with a certain surprise, and put it down to a lack of sense; on the contrary, if we see a child precociously sinful, hardened in lying, deliberate and cunning in planning and executing wickedness, we feel a certain horror and shock, as at something unnatural; and consider, very properly, that the youthfulness of the offender renders the matter more serious, and the prognosis more grave.

Sex.—The difference in the evil moral tendencies of men and women is largely due to the influence of long custom upon their habits and pursuits. To eliminate this influence, and determine the effect of sex itself is a very difficult matter, because the secondary inherited characteristics that have become grafted on to the male and female moral types have become so inextricably woven in with the innate characteristics that their differentiation is now hardly possible. Probably the only way to trace these innate moral factors would be to study them in the beings that show the dawnings of the moral sense, namely the higher domestic animals and the lowest savages. Of course, between these

two there is an unbridgeable hiatus. The study of them does not, however, give much more information than this: that fundamentally the male sex is associated with activity, and the female with passivity. To enter into the evidence for this view would take me out of my present subject, and I will content myself with referring such of my readers as may be interested in the matter to a work in the Contemporary Science Series, entitled "The Evolution of Sex," by Geddes and Thomson. Meanwhile, if this view is correct, as I assume it to be, the moral tendencies due to sex will be of the corresponding type. Those associated with passivity will be mostly negative; whence I conclude that the influence of the female sex is in the direction of deficiency of positive moral vigour. Moral tendencies associated with activity, on the other hand, err in the direction of excess; and it will be found that the male sex predisposes to excess of various kinds. I shall leave the question stated in these general terms, and pass on to consider the influence upon morals of sex, as modified by tradition and custom.

Man has arrogated to himself rule and supremacy. This leads to egoism, which is found more often and more conspicuously in men than in women. Custom and tradition, on men's authority, have said that it

is less disgraceful for men than for women to be intemperate and lustful; the result is self-indulgence, as a male characteristic. From of old, the brunt of conflict in war and commerce has fallen upon men; this has developed hardness, violence, and the tarnishing of the code of commercial morality. So also selfishness in its grosser forms belongs to the male nature.

Women have been confined in narrower circles, and the effect has been a deficiency of breadth and generosity. Being rendered, by their position, unable to attain their ends by strength and directness, they have developed the faculties of intrigue and subterfuge. Concealment and deceit are more conspicuous in the female moral nature.

It must, however, be remembered that the influence of sex is only in the direction of an additional tendency to certain forms of moral obliquity; neither sex has a monopoly of any individual moral disorder.

Education.—To suppose that the better educated man is necessarily the better moral character would be a great mistake. True, education ought to, and does, increase possibilities for good; but, as I have said before, greater capacity for good involves greater capacity for evil also. And so, other things being equal, the average moral tone of the gentle-

man, and that of the boor, are also equal; and this because moral health is a relative matter, depending on the standard to which a man is qualified by his education and other circumstances to attain.

The moral diseases to which the uneducated man is specially liable are largely such as are due to ignorance and want of refinement. The very vulgarity of some sins will help to save the cultured man from committing them. On the other hand, want of knowledge will prevent the ignorant man from falling into certain other sins.

The intrinsic character of the sins of the two types of men may be the same; the form, or mode of manifestation of them, will differ. Both may be cruel. In the lower type this may take the direction of wife-beating, in the higher, of refined persecution. Both may be dishonest. The lower type of man commits burglary, while the higher forges cheques.

The two types are subject to the same moral diatheses, but the resulting diseases take a different course, just as the poison of consumption may attack the lungs in one person, the joints in another, and the brain in a third.

And so, the more removed a person's moral disorders are from his own type the more serious they are, as a rule. Thus, if a man of birth and educa-

tion is guilty of gross brutality, or if an ignorant man shows special ingenuity in defrauding, the prognosis is more grave in each case.

Similar considerations to those based on education apply to the comparison between the sins of civilised and barbarian people. The Englishman is not necessarily more moral, on the average, than the African bushman, but his sins are more refined. But there is no doubt that the best civilised man is better, morally, than the best barbarian, not because he obeys his conscience more rigidly, but because his moral code is higher. And this is true also of the educated man, as compared with the uneducated. Two artists may work equally conscientiously, but the work produced by the genius is better than that of the mediocre man. The conclusion is, therefore, absolutely in favour of education and culture, for, at the risk of greater responsibility, the greater possibilities of good are secured. Far better the earnest, upward striving towards the heights of moral excellence, though with slips and falls by the way, than the passive vegetating on the lowlands of moral mediocrity, or the dead sea level of moral inferiority.

Social Position and Occupation.—These bring in their train moral differences corresponding to those due to education, and with them may be considered

the influence respectively of riches and of poverty, each of which has its special temptations.

A man's daily work not infrequently favours a tendency to moral disorders of special kinds. The workman paid by time is liable to indolence; the cashier to dishonesty; the priest to spiritual pride; the artist to emotional excesses; the official, speaking generally, to bribery. If proof were needed, it would be found in the special regard in which are held the industrious workman, the honest cashier, the humble priest, the temperate artist, and the impartial official. Indeed, the calling in life that has not its particular temptations would probably be difficult to find. As I have said before, a predisposition to a moral disorder, due to external circumstances, is not to be regarded as an *excuse* for such a disorder; but in diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment, these special difficulties must be taken into account, and the efforts put forth against them must be recognised.

In other cases, an occupation leads to moral disease, not directly, but by reaction. All essentially monotonous occupations come under this description, especially if the hours of work are long; and the danger is much increased by the absence of healthy interests outside the working groove. Reactionary moral disorders often take the form of

intemperance and debauchery, and in this way we explain the prevalence of these diseases among sailors, soldiers, and others.

Many cases of mischief, unruliness, and disorder among school-children, and especially schoolboys, are of the nature of reaction; and here be it noted that such reaction is more common among active natures, and so it prevails more among boys than among girls.

When labourers have been toiling sixty-six hours in the week, it is not very surprising that many of them pass Saturday night and Sunday in a condition of intoxication. Tailors often work fourteen or fifteen hours a day for three or four days in the week. The reaction comes, and it is a well-known complaint of master-tailors that their men cannot be depended upon for the rest of the time.

Want of work has also its own sequence of moral disorders. Idleness, waste of time, frivolity, gossip, are among the less serious. Idleness, combined with wealth, is the great incentive to all the society sins, which wreck homes and characters, and supply sensational scandal for a sensation-loving public.

The special sins to which wealth and poverty predispose are too well known to require enumerating. Far back in the patriarchal days, Agur, the son of Jakeh, prayed, "Two things have I asked of

thee; deny me them not before I die: give me neither poverty nor riches; feed me with the bread of my portion, lest I be full, and deny thee, and say, Who is the Lord? or lest I be poor, and steal, and use profanely the name of my God."

Opportunity.—According to the sum total of the circumstances in which two people are placed will the average standard of their moral health be. In many cases, virtue (in respect to any particular fault) is due to the absence of temptation. We have illustration of this when people of previously good repute, and restricted experience, are transferred to an environment of temptation, and straightway yield. True, we find pure, true lives passed in the midst of temptation, as we find the reverse; but, still, in average cases, the difference between two men or two women, the one of good and the other of ill repute, is often a matter of circumstance, and nothing more. Reflection on these things will often lead us to moderate both our self-appreciation and our censure of others.

A moral disorder is of course aggravated when there has been no special temptation to it, when the opportunity has been sought instead of being met with unsought in the course of the daily life. One ground of the condemnation of the man who stole the one ewe-lamb of his poor neighbour was

that he had lambs of his own in plenty. The rich lady who pleads "kleptomania" when convicted of stealing a piece of silk is more blameworthy than the poor vagrant who has stolen a loaf of bread, although the latter may receive a more stringent sentence.

For purposes of diagnosis, and treatment, this question of opportunity must be carefully considered by the moral physician, and for purposes of self-examination, by all. Its influence was known of old; it was recognised in the petition, "Lead us not into temptation." Indeed, there is perhaps no single factor that is of greater importance in the causation of moral disease.

> "How oft the sight of means to do ill deeds
> Makes ill deeds done."

The condition of the mind and body is of such importance that I shall reserve the consideration of its influence for the next chapter.

CHAPTER XII.

CAUSATION OF MORAL DISEASE—*(Continued).*

The Influence of Bodily and Mental Conditions.

I HAVE already spoken of the dependence of moral health upon the health of body and mind; indeed, this is the foundation on which the whole of our considerations on the subject of moral pathology have been based. Here we must look into the matter in somewhat greater detail.

I may be met at the outset with this objection: that many instances have been known in which physical invalids have given to the world an example of pure and useful lives. Now it may be at once granted that many people with shattered health and with mental powers not of the strongest have led lives much more healthy, morally, than some of their neighbours, whose bodily and mental condition was perfectly sound. But the point for us to consider is this: whether, if these invalids (in body or mind) had been physically and mentally

robust, their moral health would not also have been of a more vigorous type; and I think it may be maintained that this would have been the case. Have not the best of such people had weak points in their character, properly accounted for by their bodily or mental weakness? This will be admitted by all. Consequently the general statement holds true, that with people of average type, their moral condition will be closely related to their condition of body and mind. I am not comparing one exceptional delicate person with another exceptional healthy one. I am rather comparing, in the case of any ordinary person, the moral tone of such an one when he is healthy with his moral tone when he is unhealthy.

The effect of bodily ill-health is to disturb the normal mental and moral powers. A man who is writhing in acute pain is incapable of connected thought and calm reasoning; his judgment has its balance disturbed; and his moral sense is correspondingly affected. As a rule, a certain irritability is developed, and self-control is weakened. Examples of this are frequent. Even the comparatively mild discomfort of moderate hunger is enough to alter the disposition in most cases; so that by common consent we refrain from appealing to a person's good-nature or generosity at such a time.

And in the presence of pain, the irritability is proportionately greater. When a woman is tormented with neuralgia or a "splitting headache"; when a man is in the throes of an attack of gout or rheumatism, irritability is expected and condoned. "You must not mind what he says; he is not feeling well!" How often have we heard this phrase, and used it ourselves!

Bodily discomfort may have the same effect as actual pain. We do not expect cheerfulness and good temper from a chronic dyspeptic; our very name "melancholy" (black bile), implies the influence of such disturbances on the mind. Nor is irritability the only result of pain and discomfort; selfishness is engendered, and consideration for others sinks into the background. A peevish person is generally selfish and inconsiderate; and as a rule some defective bodily condition underlies the whole disposition.

There are many conditions of ill-health where there is no actual or tangible pain or discomfort; but the ill-defined *malaise* is quite enough to disturb the normal moral relations. Women especially are sufferers from this; and I may here remark that under such circumstances they have usually more self-control than men. Their more delicate organisation is more readily thrown out of gear;

but their constitutional patience or passivity comes to their relief. With many people changes in atmospheric conditions act similarly, producing a condition of nervous restlessness, of depression, and of irritability. Nor is this to be wondered at; on the delicate protoplasm of many plants, sunlight and shade, heat and cold, dryness and moisture, have a direct effect; and in our so complex organization the influence of these forces may be equally keenly felt.

The influence of bodily ill-health is not limited to the directions above-described. When more prolonged it gives rise to indifference, in which condition the sharp boundary lines of right and wrong are apt to become blurred. The moral rein is held slackly, and deviations to right and left are more easy, and also more frequent. With certain kinds of disease the moral sense becomes not only blunted but distorted, instances of which are familiar to medical men. Indifference, moreover, may pass on into disheartening and despair; and then crimes of all possible kinds and of all magnitudes may be committed. Suicide is but one of them.

The effect of bodily ill-health is thus primarily on the disposition, passing through the whole gamut of possibilities from peevishness and mor-

oseness to moral insensibility, despair and depravity.

The influence of the condition of the mind has also a wide range. From the above considerations it will be seen that the varying mental conditions are often secondary, depending primarily on ill-health of body. But there is another set of mental conditions to be reviewed, depending little if at all on the bodily health; and among these we find, standing in the front rank, the influence of the emotions.

It is well known to medical men that in the graver forms of epilepsy the severe attacks are often followed by a peculiar mental condition in which the sufferer is not responsible for his actions; and that these actions may take a violent form, even to homicide. A parallel condition follows many emotional storms; the sufferer may have neither knowledge of nor control over his actions. The nature of such actions will depend in part on the nature of the emotional disturbance. Thus after great anger (rightly described as short madness) deeds of violence may be committed, as they may also during the attack of anger. In this way many private and public tragedies have originated. When anger has been associated with the smart of injustice, or of injury (deserved or not), we have

the mood in which revenge is born; and the nature of such revenge will depend on the character of the injured person and the extent of the injury: one will meditate violence, even to murder; another will craftily plot and scheme till his oppressor fall in other ways. Disappointment has its own brood of evils that follow in its train. Hardness and cynicism are among the foremost; and if self-respect has been wounded, there is every prospect of some stages of moral degradation. It is thus that intemperance, prodigality and profligacy sometimes begin; and they may go to extremes; while in other cases where the moral constitution is strong the man may pick up again the reins which he had allowed to hang loose on the neck of his impulses, and the downward course is stayed. These remarks apply also to disappointment in love, especially when the love has been of the egoistic and passionate type fostered by sensational reading. For disappointed passion does not commonly react towards asceticism; it rather becomes transformed in other directions. Even among higher natures, the heart that has been prepared for a great passion tends to expend its gathered energy upon other objects, rather than become self-contained and encysted. It does not require a very extended acquaintance with the world to enable

one to recognise many illustrations of this; the annals of humanity abound with records of moral disorders arising from these disappointments.

Ambition is not simply an emotion; it is in large part an intellectual attitude; but it is leavened with emotion; and it has its own tendencies to moral disease; notably unscrupulousness. Ambition is like a snowball in a snowy field; it grows and gathers momentum in proportion as it is fed. In its progress, right often becomes overshadowed by expediency; and expediency becomes less and less discriminating. The end that is justified by the means is apt to be served by means foul as well as fair. As the revolving sphere grows larger, it requires larger and larger obstacles to arrest its progress; it commonly arrives sooner or later upon a slope where it is precipitated to its own destruction.

Emotions of the better class are not without their dangers; we may instance "revivalism." When impulses to good are planted upon the forcing-bed of revivalism, they are apt to outgrow their strength; and they either die of exhaustion, leading to "back-sliding"; or, instead of yielding the fruits of noble action they may produce nothing but leaves of "professions," or in some cases the noxious blooms of pharisaical hypocrisy.

Emotions of healthy happiness, and of "love that finds its earthly close," have commonly no bad result; except that if too intense, their subjects may experience a temporary exhaustion.

Emotions of fatigue due to long and unsuccessful strife, physical or mental, are generally associated with depression. In the condition of moral languor which supervenes, the voice of the tempter may have an alluring force full of danger. The desire to float without effort on the stream of necessity has some of the deadly fascination which allures to a fatal sleep people exposed to long and intense cold. The condition is specially dangerous in those of an energetic and ardent disposition. Mr. Meredith describes it in his graphic way: "She was faint with strife and dejected, a condition in the young when their imaginative energies hold revel uncontrolled, and are projectively desperate." We may illustrate it further by the words of the murderers in *Macbeth*, where some possible effects of misfortune are depicted:—

"*First Murderer.* I am one, my liege,
Whom the vile blows and buffets of the world
Have so incens'd that I am reckless what
I do, to spite the world.

"*Second Murderer.* And I another
So weary with disasters, tugg'd with fortune,

That I would set my life on any chance,
To mend it, or be rid on't."

But besides these powerful emotions, with their conspicuous possibilities for evil, we have other mental conditions whose influence is not so deep-seated, though it may be more enduring. I refer to the influence of "moods." Moods are of various origin, some bodily, some mental. As a rule their production is independent of will, and even of consciousness. Once recognised in one's self they ought to be summarily dealt with. But they often arise, I say, unconsciously. A meal undigested, a close atmosphere, a change of weather, an apprehension of evil to come, a nameless, vague *malaise* of mind or body, any of these may result in a certain mood, and sometimes the origin is still more obscure. Moods contest with the will the direction of actions. For will itself is the guide, not the source of action. The source lies deeper, dependent oftentimes on impressions received at an earlier date. Consequently when direct purpose or will is in abeyance it falls to the lot of the mood to direct, or at least to influence, action.

Moods of depression have unhealthy tendencies; the reverse commonly holds true of moods of exaltation. Fretfulness, irritability, a facility for

quarrelling and wounding, these are the most frequent fruits of unhealthy moods. At other times the mood is itself one of suppressed irritability; then a slight or even trivial cause may be enough to cause an explosion in violence of word or deed. The mood of indifference, of apathy, resulting from defeat after effort is apt to prepare the way for an outburst of recklessness which may take on riotous forms.

Moods gather strength and persistency by indulgence; to some natures especially such indulgence becomes a kind of moral intoxication, just as a morbid pleasure is derived from indulging in grief. Hence in recurrent and prolonged moods there is danger to be apprehended; they may pass over by insensible gradation into one or other type of unhealthy moral diathesis. Further, moods cannot as a rule last long, or recur frequently, without consciousness of them; their encouragement is then due to a type of egoism, and the individual who excuses his actions on the score of his moods is an egoist. Moods may fittingly be compared to evil thoughts; says Milton:—

> "Evil into the mind of God or man
> May come and go, so unapproved, and leave
> No spot or blame behind."

But moods, like evil thoughts, once recognised and allowed to remain, leave a spot and invite blame. As in the case of other influences tending to moral disorder, the attitude must vary, according as we are considering them in ourselves or in others. In speaking to one's own heart the influence must not be regarded as an excuse, but when regarding it in others, it must be allowed as an extenuating circumstance. It is, indeed, a safe general rule, to judge one's own actions with rigour, and the actions of others with charity. Especially does this attitude become the moral physician.

Other influences, more strictly mental, have an effect upon moral action. Mental pre-occupation, worry, anxiety, may have the effect of depressing moods; in any case they tend to blunt the keenness of moral discrimination. For, in mental processes, two absorbing interests cannot equally and efficiently occupy the attention; one must take a secondary place. A passionate lover of music may become practically deaf to the sound of his favourite symphony, may even feel it vaguely as an irritating noise, if strongly pre-occupied with some weighty matter; and this subordination of one interest to another is the more marked the greater the individual's power of concentration.

There are, of course, some moral actions to which

the individual's nature is so attuned, which have, in fact, become by habit so much a part of him, that they are performed unconsciously whilst attention is fixed elsewhere; as the accomplished pianist may correctly play a difficult piece whilst engaged in serious conversation on another topic. But other moral actions require careful attention, and demand a disengaged mind, otherwise the result may be a moral blunder, a *faux-pas*.

Briefly, the matter may be formulated thus: that mental or bodily disturbance disqualifies more or less for forming moral judgments; and interferes with the action of the Will. In this way many moral disorders are to be, not excused, but explained.

Lest my considerations of the causation of moral disease as dwelt upon in these two chapters should seem in any way tinged with fatalism, I close this chapter with the remark, that once such influences come within the range of consciousness I have entire faith in the guiding power of will and of conscience. In these matters also,

"Man is man, and master of his fate."

CHAPTER XIII.

SELFISHNESS.

A DISTINCTION must be drawn between egoism and selfishness. The former is the constant and often almost unconscious pursuit of selfish ends; and when such pursuit is conscious, it is essentially calculating. Selfishness is a grosser and less diplomatic vice; it seeks simply present satisfaction. The cause of selfishness is often a deficiency of moral education, especially in the direction of self-control. The primitive instincts of human nature are towards self-gratification, using the word in a comprehensive sense, and when the satisfying of these instincts involves no injury to oneself or to others, the gratification is right. But the person unaccustomed to self-control makes no distinction; if he dimly realises a sense of obligation, this is so evanescent as to exercise no check on his actions. In other cases, selfishness is the outcome of mere thoughtlessness; very often, if the person concerned

were to pause to reflect on the effects of his selfishness, he would act otherwise. Considered broadly, selfishness is the result and the indication of a low type of moral development. It is true, selfishness is the most universal of faults; but it presents very varying degrees, so that one man acts selfishly occasionally, and it may be in small matters; whilst in the case of another man, his outward life may be a succession of selfish actions, some small and some great. The first man is generally sensible of his errors, and grieves over them; the second experiences only occasional and transient regrets.

Further, selfishness is a matter of motive as well as of action. Some people of selfish disposition appear better than they are, because their surroundings restrict their indulgence; whilst others, free to follow their bent, and perhaps accustomed by their training to be waited upon and to think only of themselves, often act selfishly without any intention of doing so.

Selfishness is in every way harmful. It may cause much suffering to other people; it injures the person's own character, by weakening his power of resisting evil, and sooner or later it blights the reputation. A selfish man may be feared and obeyed; he is never loved or honoured. Even if he achieves

worldly success, he is likely to enjoy it but little; and he passes away,

"Unwept, unhonoured, and unsung."

Selfishness is a protean form of moral disorder; it comes out in every department of life and conduct, and affects all sorts and conditions of men, marring all life's beauty, and turning all its sweetness sour. It is often in small things that its effects are most unpleasantly shown. To live with a selfish person is a continual misery.

It would be impossible to give a catalogue of selfish actions; but it will be instructive to consider in outline some of the ways in which selfishness may mould the character.

Not uncommonly it produces an arrogant, overbearing manner, exercised especially towards inferiors in wealth or station. This is one of the most contemptible of its forms, because the points of superiority do not in any way depend upon intrinsic worth. Strip the man of his accidental wealth and position, and he is probably a pitiable enough object. The grades of arrogance range from simple superciliousness to offensive discourtesy. Or the mood may be one of conceit and vanity, born perhaps of another factor for which the in-

dividual can claim no merit, such as personal beauty or talent. A small modicum of conceit is not much drawback; its total deficiency is often coupled with dullness and an absence of enthusiasm; but this is very different from foppishness and idle time-wasting vanity.

Another mood born of selfishness is obstinacy, negative like that of the proverbial mule, or positive in self-assertion. It takes several forms; sometimes a dogged resistance without adequate reason; sometimes unwillingness to yield to conclusive argument; sometimes the objectionable attitude conveyed in the phrase, "I have said it, and that is enough." The rare art of gracefully and sincerely acknowledging wrong or defeat is not possessed by these people.

The self-feeling may expand into another mood, namely pharisaism. This is generally due to ill-directed religious influences of a narrow kind, coupled with ignorance, or at least want of thought. Reflection would soon convince the sufferers from this disorder of the supreme impertinence of arrogating to themselves an especial interest in the sight of an over-ruling Deity; it would cause them to realise the dependence of their supposed superiority on circumstance and opportunity; and it would show them that, compared with the lofty

standard of absolute perfection, even the outward difference between the Pharisee and the publican is so small as to be a negligeable quantity. It must be remembered, however, that the Pharisee has commonly many good points, overshadowed by his very pharisaism. Thus his moral standard is, as a rule, high; and he tries to live up to it. He is earnest in his life, and often does much good. But the good is continually discounted by his anxiety to let his right hand know what his left hand is doing.

In considering the causes of selfishness, it must be remembered that physical infirmity often plays a large part. Confirmed sufferers and invalids are apt, from the nature of the case, to become selfish. They are greatly dependent on other people; and their suffering constantly draws their attention to their own condition. Clearly they are entitled to some pity as well as blame. Fortunately for the credit of our humanity, however, it often happens that sufferers set an example of patience and unselfishness; and this example has a most healthy tonic effect on those of robust constitution who are selfish through thoughtlessness.

Selfishness is to be ranked among progressive moral disorders; if neglected, it goes from bad to worse. For the cure of selfishness there

are two prescriptions: self-control and care for others.

If self-control be taught and exercised from the beginning, the manifestations of selfishness will be much restrained, and its harmful effects avoided. But it does not follow that the innate spirit of selfishness will be rooted out; for this something more is wanted. In the presence of any special temptation to selfishness, self-control is also urgently required; and the more it has been practised previously, the easier will it be. Consequently, there is a certain utility in the cultivation of the spirit of self-restraint and self-sacrifice; the man who has done this has his impulses well in hand; he is master of himself, and can draw rein at the proper moment. But it must be pointed out that this alone has some counter-balancing disadvantages. In the first place, undue self-restraint has a narrowing effect upon character; and an example of this is supplied by the spirit of the old puritans. Their moral life was correct; but, on the whole, they were not lovable. In the second place, self-control when pursued too exclusively develops justice at the expense of mercy; and the subject of it is apt to become harsh, unsympathetic and uncharitable in his attitude towards the faults of others. In the third place, in a nature of the

emotionally religious type, religious egoism is fostered; and in this case the platform of selfishness is changed, whilst the selfishness itself remains. We then have the type of man who forsakes the world and its interests, its joys and its sorrows, to "work out his own salvation in fear and trembling"; the one absorbing question in his mind is not, "What good can I do?" but "What must I do to be saved?" The egoism and the unreasonableness of this position require no demonstration.

Self-control is then, in its way, good and necessary; yet is there a more excellent way, namely, altruism—the care for others. This principle is of special use in dealing with the general and underlying spirit of selfishness. The best way to conquer selfishness is to leave the question of self alone, as a secondary matter; to not even consider, primarily, how this self can be improved If attention be strongly directed to the wants, the rights, the interests of other people, selfishness will become weaker, and even die a natural death. Many people are selfish simply because they have no other motive, no other object to live for. Supply the motive for unselfishness, provide an outside object on which interest may be directed, and the battle is already over. Even in the immediate presence of temptation, while exercise of

self-control is a shield, the thought, "How does this affect other people?" becomes a strong weapon of attack, and the probabilities of victory are at once increased. It is in some cases good that self should be annihilated; an enemy is thus put *hors de combat;* but it is better still that this enemy be won over as an ally; that the self be employed to help in the conflict, as a servant ministering to the effort to help others. Of course, when rightly understood, this is the simple meaning of self-control; but too often self-control is interpreted as self-destruction, self-sacrifice. Self-sacrifice itself is good, and is called for when the contest of interests is between those of self and those of others; but when self-sacrifice is aimed at simply as a general means of overcoming selfish tendencies, it is not good, and that for two reasons. Firstly, it is a waste of power; secondly, it is generally futile. I say it is a waste of power; if we have to deal with a force of any kind that may be destructive, such as fire or water, it is much better to turn it into channels of usefulness than to aim simply at its harmless dissipation. It is also often futile, as the late James Hinton pointed out when speaking of the penance of the old monastic system. The devotees said, Let us subdue and destroy self by the denial of pleasure. Too often the pleasure in life

was destroyed, while the self remained to harass them. They would have found a much shorter and more effective method by going into the world and ministering to its sufferers, instead of retiring into caves and monasteries to fast and to scourge themselves.

True altruism then aims first at securing the well-being of others; and for this purpose it employs self-control, not simply with the object of "crucifying the flesh," but as a means to a higher end, the employment of self, namely, as a servant in the ministry of good.

In this way shall selfishness be overcome.

CHAPTER XIV.

INDOLENCE.

INDOLENCE is largely dependent on physical conditions; and this dependence is more easily seen than is the case with the majority of moral disorders. Some people are naturally energetic; their reflexes are prompt, and they are quick in movement as well as in thought; whilst inactivity is utterly distasteful. On the contrary, some people are naturally slow or even apathetic; they are leisurely in their actions, and deliberate in their thoughts. If imaginative, they are often dreamy; if otherwise, they are simply listless. So far we have to deal simply with physical qualities; it is probable that the deeply-seated chemical changes that take place in the body-cells, especially the nerve-cells, are correspondingly slow. And while there may be considerable bodily strength, there is but little agility. These people are not of the stuff of which athletes are made. To complete the picture, we find that these people are often stout

and good-natured; they are not readily harassed and worried, but "take life as it comes," in a phlegmatic if not in a philosophical manner.

Evidently there are some good points about such a character; but there is much risk of evil developments. For life is not a mere vegetative existence, to be passed in drifting, dreamless or even dreamful ease. Activity and work are demanded of every one.

Indolence leads to many faults. In childhood it causes personal untidiness and slovenliness. And though this may be partly overcome when *amour-propre* awakens, in the days of puberty, the traces of untidiness are generally left in the surroundings and in work. Untidiness even affects thought, so that a person thus affected thinks disconnectedly, spasmodically. There is no proper orderly sequence in his ideas, and his actions suffer correspondingly. Further, the work of an indolent person is not thorough; if he is compelled by circumstances to do work of some kind, it is apt to be scamped and superficial. The best example of this is seen in the work of an indolent servant. Dust is left in corners and crevices, and in all places that do not at once attract attention; vessels are wiped instead of washed; rubbish is allowed to accumulate in cupboards and dark places. There results, in fact,

dishonesty in work. Among the indolent poor, a smart dress covers underclothing that is ragged and dirty; the outside of the house is presentable; the inside reeks with litter and dirt. And without cleanliness there is no godliness.

Indolence leads also to incompleteness and to want of continuity. A score of things are begun; not one is finished. Clearly no good work can result from this. A young man starts in some kind of business; in six months he tires and does something else. He is dismissed from one situation for unpunctuality, from another for untidiness, from a third for carelessness, until he finds himself "out of the running," in the ranks of the unemployed. Once there, a wide field of opportunities for evil opens out before him.

In the beginning, indolence is unconscious; it is simply a natural bent. But soon duties of different kinds call to effort; when this call is unheeded, the wrong begins, because the call cannot be neglected unconsciously. It is a form of self-indulgence; that which is easy and pleasant is allowed to take the place of that which is right, and the onset of moral degeneration has been reached. Many are saved from this by the necessity of earning their daily bread. When this necessity does not exist indolence leads by easy and

rapid stages to vice. For by indulgence, self-control is weakened; and the call of duty is unheeded when the call of pleasure is also heard. In many cases the final stage is that of sensuality.

To a man or woman in early life no more perilous doctrine can be taught than this, that there is no need to work. It is not necessary to urge those who are well-to-do to enter into competition with those who must work for their living; apart from this there are many directions in which activity can be usefully employed for the benefit of the State and of society. In philanthropic efforts there is unbounded scope for those who have money and leisure. Knowledge and culture are open to all; and no man who so enriches himself impoverishes his neighbour. At present work is still regarded as degrading by a pseudo-aristocracy, and especially manual work. The example travels down through all classes of society. The aristocrat who has nothing at all to do looks down on the man with a profession, the professional man looks down on the "man of business," the "man of business" in turn despises the tradesman, and the tradesman will not associate with the artisan.

One result is this, that those who have received a smattering of education such as their fathers and mothers did not possess, regard manual work with

contempt; the man who would have been an excellent artisan becomes a bad clerk; the girl with qualities to make a first-class domestic servant prefers to be a third-rate shop girl. The education of the "masses," which should be of priceless value to the nation as a whole, making a man a better farm labourer, and a girl a more competent dairy-maid, tends to disturb, if not overturn, the whole condition of society, and the secret of the whole thing is the contempt for humble labour. In this matter, the indolent rich, who are the original offenders, become the ultimate sufferers, whilst almost all classes suffer in some degree.

But this is not a treatise on sociology, and I must keep to my subject of indolence as a moral disorder. Like so many other moral disorders, it is progressive. Its cure is comparatively easy in the early stages; later it is practically incurable. Consequently, treatment must be begun, as a rule, in early life. But before considering the subject of treatment, I must make a passing reference to that variety of indolence which is apt to come on, in adult life, in a nature originally energetic. Depressing influences, in general, may lead to this kind of indolence. Failure, disappointment, ill-health, have sometimes this effect. For a time there is no motive for effort, no inspiration to action. Or it

may be simply the reaction from excessive work, a reaction which is beneficial. The idleness due to disinclination for work which follows the passing of an arduous examination is a good illustration. But indolence that is produced by these causes is essentially evanescent; the nature's elasticity asserts itself after a time. It is only when the circumstances of depression are enduring that the indolence may become chronic. We need not, therefore, dwell upon it at greater length.

The treatment of indolence consists essentially in supplying a motive for activity; and in proportion as this motive is enduring will the cure effected be permanent. The best motive to supply is the idea, when early implanted, that work is in itself honourable, and that the idle man, whatever be his wealth or position, is a man to be despised. If this thought take deep root, idleness is no longer possible. One word as to the method of implanting this idea in the young. The effort is likely to be vain if the child does not also have plenty of healthful pleasure and recreation; the child who is kept to long and arduous work is in danger of reaction as soon as he has liberty. Another motive for action is independence. This is honourable, and is sufficient for many. If this motive does not appeal, an effective one may be found in the de-

pendence of others, especially wife or children, upon the individual's efforts. Ambition for fame, position, wealth, or other success often forms a powerful motive, but it is neither so lofty nor so enduring as the preceding ones. I need not dwell on the value of love as an incentive; it has been extolled in prose and in verse, and with a worthy object it is all-powerful. Passing downwards in our review of motives, we come to those that have to be employed with natures deficient in the higher aims and ideals; such are the fear of disgrace or punishment, the censure of the world, and the terrors of the law. On the lowest physical level we have to fall back upon the risk to personal safety, and hunger. According to the type of person to be dealt with must the appeal be made, remembering this, that with every individual the highest responsive elements in his nature are to be played upon at first. A lower motive should never be urged when a higher is effectual.

The motive of conscientiousness is fundamentally the first one named, combined with the motive of love. So also the religious motive is really a combination of these two. Once a start is made, the cure of indolence is hopeful, even in later life; for the happiness derived from work is soon found to be one of the most substantial and enduring of the

forms of happiness, and idleness comes to be associated, as it should be normally, with wretchedness.

CHAPTER XV.

DISHONESTY.

DISHONESTY is primarily due to arrested moral development. It is in this manner that it appears in childhood. As a rule, a child is dishonest because it does not know better, or because the broad distinctions between right and wrong are not clearly defined. In many of the criminal class dishonesty in later years remains as a partial result of want of development. So also, among many savage tribes, dishonesty is not considered in any way wrong; on the contrary, it is often admired as an indication of sharpness and cleverness.

It appears that these primitive ideas have largely found their way into our modern commercial system, so that "commercial morality" has come to be a satirical term, indicating a kind of dishonesty of this sort: "The perpetrator of such dishonesty shall thereby reap to himself advantage, at the expense of another man, but he shall not expose himself to detection, nor to the clutches of the law."

With these provisos the commercial conscience is salved, and cheating, roguery, nay, actual theft, come in for their due share of admiration, as indicating "a keen eye to business" in a smart man. The dupe does not always share in the admiration, except in so far as he therefrom learns a lesson, which enables him to dupe somebody else. The alternative method of succeeding in commerce is by extra hard work, patience, and the seizing of proper opportunities. But this method is more arduous, and does not readily commend itself to the majority. There are many who, outside their business relations, are men of high moral code, whilst in those relations they are, plainly speaking, dishonest. If passingly rebuked by their own conscience, or by some other person, the answer is ready: "It is the dupe's look-out, not mine." The idea that a man is morally bound to consider the interests of those with whom he has dealings, and to assist the weak in obtaining just and fair treatment, does not apparently enter into the average commercial mind, and if it were suggested to such a man he would probably reply, "The struggle is keen, each man fighting for his own hand; I must push my way up." And he forgets, or does not know, that, however keen the struggle, no man has a right to rise by treading on the neck of another,

or to advance by pushing his neighbour back. The dishonesty that brings the culprit into the police-courts, for burglary, picking pockets, shop-lifting, or forgery, is as mere dust in the balance when compared, in its magnitude, with commercial immorality.

Whilst dishonesty is primarily due to arrested moral development, there are other and more significant factors in its later stages. Among these factors, selfishness, avarice, and ambition, play a leading part. Hereby is engendered also the feverish desire to get rich in the shortest time, and with the smallest effort. Betting, gambling, speculating, these are the principal directions in which this desire acts. Here again an important fact is ignored, namely, that every accession of wealth that is independent of production implies proportionate loss to someone else. I am not, of course, speaking of legacies, which are in a different category.

The forms of dishonesty of which the law takes cognizance are so obvious that nothing here need be said of them except this: that the moral physician is called upon to discriminate between those acts which result from dishonesty, as such, and those which are due to other moral disorders, for which some extenuating reason may or may not be properly found.

But dishonesty does not consist solely in taking what is not one's own. It may extend to speech, to judgments, and to other actions.

Untruth is dishonesty, whether it takes the form of the words of a lie, or of an action calculated to deceive. The notions of many people about untruth are absolutely childish. For the essence of untruth is the conveying of a wrong impression, and the gravity of the offence is in no way lessened when the wrong impression is conveyed by a partial truth, by an action without words, or by silence. So also an actual mis-statement in words may in reality be the truth, because the idea conveyed is true. It is, therefore, the duty of one who wishes to be truthful to consider, not so much what his words or actions mean to himself, as what idea they will convey to his hearer. If I say, "The sun rose at five this morning," this is actually a mis-statement, but it conveys a definite and correct idea, and my statement is therefore true. A good deal of juggling with words is sometimes indulged in, in order to give a mistaken impression, whilst the words themselves are correct. This is, of course, dishonesty.

Dishonesty in judgments means injustice. It may affect no one but the person concerned, but all the same it is a moral blot. Owing to the want of sufficient knowledge, justice is often not possible;

but when bias, indolence or personal comfort is allowed to interfere in the settling of the claims of two persons, or of two opinions, injustice is committed, and the individual is convicted of dishonesty. Many people are in greater or less degree dishonest in their opinions, either because an inquiry into the claims of some contrary opinion would involve exertion, or because holding an opposite opinion would be against their interests or inclinations. The process of stifling mental inquiry upon subjects social, political, scientific, or religious, is dishonest. Of this the man who is naturally truthful will not be guilty. The effective sifting of evidence, in the search for truth, implies, no doubt, mental qualities of a certain order, but the most modest intellect may be honest in listening to both sides of a question, and in refusing to allow matters to be settled by prejudice or personal interest. Even if the type of mental development is so low that only one impression can be retained at a time, and the faculty of judgment is almost in abeyance, there is still no excuse for dishonesty, unless, indeed, a plea of idiocy or insanity can be substantiated.

Broadly speaking, the two great causes of dishonesty are ignorance and selfishness.

The treatment of dishonesty, to be effectual, must go to the root of the matter. Much is to be

done, in the direction of prevention, by proper education. A thorough grounding in unselfishness is in itself almost sufficient, for it will do away with all dishonesty except such as may result from ignorance. But the possibility of the latter must be prevented also by instruction. The essential idea to implant in the mind is the necessity of honesty in thought and motive; as the Psalmist said, "Thou requirest truth in the inward parts." Beside which, I may again quote the great dramatist's injunction, "This, above all, to thine own self be true." The intrinsic love of fair-play, of justice in the abstract, is one which, to take root, must be planted early, and exposed to the sunshine of example. For in later life it cannot be inculcated by ordinary incentives, whether religious or utilitarian. At any stage the grosser manifestations of dishonesty, such as lying, stealing, forgery, etc., can be checked; the law steps in, assisted by motives of policy and expediency, to do this. But there will still be wanting that grand characteristic of truthfulness which is perhaps the most noble of all single virtues: which works for good in producing trustworthiness, constancy, the courage of convictions at the expense of personal advantages, "the love of truth, and all that makes a man:" and which is, indeed, man's chief patent of nobility.

CHAPTER XVI.

TEMPER.

THE diseases discussed in the three foregoing chapters are largely due, in the first instance, to incomplete moral development. Those described in this and the following chapter have the common characteristic of being due to want of self-control, but the results of this lack are sufficiently different to warrant their consideration under separate headings.

Physiologically speaking, temper is due to a too rapid reflex or response to external impressions; and it will generally be found that people of a quick (rather than a surly) temper are also quick and active in most things. In itself this quickness, this rapid reaction, is an advantage, and leads to promptitude of action and "presence of mind"; but that it may be useful to its possessor, and to the community, it must be tutored and placed under certain restraints. This is the function of

education and civilisation. The boy, like the savage, is apt to make prompt retaliation of blow for blow; but a man, especially a civilised man, is expected to allow reflection and reason to intervene between an in-coming impression and an out-going action. Otherwise, he is acting, to this extent, as a child or a barbarian.

An outburst of temper is physically a waste of energy. It is sometimes pleaded that violence, in word or action, is a relief, a safety-valve, for feelings which, if pent-up, would be harmful; but for this there is really no foundation; for an outlet may generally be found in other and more useful directions. An analogy will help us. If a large quantity of water be carried to the top of a high tower, it will, in that position, possess a certain amount of energy which, as long as it is not used, is called potential. Once this is released, it is what scientists call kinetic or active, and it may become either constructive or destructive; that is, it may, on the one hand, do useful mechanical work, or it may, on the other hand, if poured down at random, cause damage.

The feelings when worked upon may also be said to possess potential energy; and in providing an outlet for them, their manifestation may be "destructive" in the form of oaths and imprecations,

of slamming doors, striking blows, or other acts of violence; or, on the other hand, they may be turned to useful purpose if only self-control keep them latent long enough. If evidence of these statements be required, it will be found in the fact that any great outbreak of temper is physically and mentally exhausting, whilst the man who, though incensed and irritated, retains his self-control, retains also an increased strength of purpose and physical capacity for endurance or for action, as the case may require. Indulgence in temper is therefore a waste of energy. And just as lazy people are said to give themselves eventually the most work, so also impulsive people are constantly having to recover lost ground by their recurring regrets, while they exclaim with Aufidius, "My rage is gone, and I am struck with sorrow." Action in haste often causes repentance at leisure.

The destructive influences of bad temper have been referred to in speaking of the "irritable diathesis"; and this destructiveness is partly due to the fact that the man in a temper has lost all sense of proportion; he is, for the time being, insane. Like the madman, he knows that his actions are wrong; like the madman also, he has not the power to act otherwise. His self-control is lost. The capacity to restrain wrath within such bounds

that it bears a just proportion to the exciting cause, is that which distinguishes a righteous indignation, a just anger, from unrighteous passion.

Indulgence in temper involves always loss of dignity, and in this way also it does harm. For the man himself this means a certain forfeiting of self-respect; and for other people, it means the diminution of their respect and of his authority. Few things weaken discipline so much as manifestations of temper on the part of superiors; and among equals the calm man gains an advantage proportionate to the loss sustained by his passionate opponent. Barrie well says, "Temper is a weapon which we hold by the blade."

We must recall what has been said above with reference to the influence upon temper of unfavourable bodily and mental conditions; not, as I have urged before, for purposes of self-excuse, but in order to be just in our judgments. A moment's reflection on the part of one who is suffering from the results of another's bad temper will often ward off the hasty wrathful answer, and lead to the kind word which so often disarms anger and shortens strife. Doubtless, the grace of humility and of unselfishness is very necessary for this course of action; but it is the imperative duty of everyone who wishes to go through life

making rough and crooked places smooth and plain.

When a person who has been brought up without self-control begins to recognise the seriousness of temper, and to exert restraint upon it, the effects are often seen, at first, in the checking of violent actions. At this stage speech may still be hasty and provocative. It is well, therefore, to recognise the signs of commencing improvement, and to encourage the effort rather than unduly censure its incompleteness. Temper is a more or less chronic complaint; and it will be idle to expect a sudden and permanent cure. Not even the most powerful incentives, such as "religious conversion," will effect this; and I have seen much moral harm done by the want of recognition of the first stages of improvement. In dealing with bodily disease, the physician must often watch carefully for the early signs of improvement, as an indication that he is to modify his line of treatment. If the severer measures adopted, when the disease is at its height, be persevered in after the turning-point has been reached, they are likely to become a hindrance instead of a help. What is the treatment to be adopted in dealing with a moral patient suffering from a bad temper? The first thing is an attitude of gentleness, without scorn, without retaliation.

To meet passion with passion will be as unfruitful as it would be for the physician to treat a lunatic by developing mania himself.

The best prescription to give to the patient is to supply him with a motive for changing his conduct. The childishness, the futility of temper, the loss of dignity and influence, may be pointed out, together with the nobility derived from self-control. The dangers to himself and to others of giving way to passion may also be dwelt upon; and the great lesson of unselfishness must be indirectly taught and illustrated. The warning of Martin Tupper is very applicable here :—

"Be sparing of advice in words; but teach thy lesson by example,
For the vanity of man may be wounded, and retort unkindly upon thee."

Of course, as in the case of all other moral disorders, the great object to be aimed at is prevention.

It is not a very difficult matter to train a quick-tempered child to self-control and unselfishness. And once the lesson is learnt the results are likely to be most promising. For, as happens with the naturally self-willed child who has been trained, we have a reserve force to fall back upon, whose

influence will be for good. If I had to choose a child for training, with the purpose of turning out a character strong and true, and active for good, I should not choose the eminently docile and amiable child, who was never known to stir itself to do wrong, but the child of quick disposition and strong will, ready to get into mischief, and cunning to devise it. For out of such ingredients the finest characters may be produced.

The point I wish, above all, to emphasise is that the two great qualities to be implanted are, unselfishness and self-control; these are the secrets of a character composed of strength and "divine gentleness."

CHAPTER XVII.

INTEMPERANCE.

JUST as temper is due to want of control over action and speech in presence of mental irritation, so intemperance is due to a want of control over desires for sensual stimulation. Intemperance takes many forms; the most notable objects of indulgence are alcoholic drinks, foods, and drugs of various kinds.

Over-indulgence in food, while due fundamentally to the same principle as the others, yet falls into a somewhat different category, because the harmful effects are principally spent on the body, and the bodily health suffers. Whilst in the case of alcohol, and of some drugs such as opium, ether, etc., the conspicuous results are mental and moral disturbance. Over-eating is also, however, a moral disorder, and so requires a few words. Sensuality in eating has the effect of blunting moral perceptions, and of predisposing to other forms of

over-indulgence. It hinders the development of the higher parts of a man's nature, and if this were its only result, it would still stand condemned. It favours indolence and leads to moral parasitism. The obligation is laid upon all to make the most of life, in the highest sense, and to resist all tendencies to arrest of growth and degeneration. The right course of action is perfectly clear and simple, and is expressed in the ancient maxim, "Eat to live." Plain living favours high thinking; whilst there is some truth in Dr. Johnson's remark, "The man who drinks beer, thinks beer." The spirit of this remark must, of course, be rightly apprehended. The rational man will avoid unhealthy extremes on either side, both excess and ascetic abstinence. Fasting, in moderation, does but little harm; but the most healthy attitude to adopt is to consider what course of life will best conduce to a proper carrying out of one's allotted life-work. As a rule, fasting, especially when extreme, is associated with undue introspection, and so leads to one form of egoism. A diet that is sufficiently full and generous favours moral, mental, and bodily vigour; one that is too spare fosters rather the lean and negative virtues. The key-note to the lives of those who have accomplished the highest and best work is moderation. Be it remembered that in-

dividual constitutions vary so much that no universal rule can be adopted. One man tells me he can work best and think clearest on a vegetarian diet, drinking nothing but water; there is no reason why he should do otherwise. Another requires a mixed diet, with moderate quantities of wine, spirits, or malted liquors; let him also act as is best for him; nor need these two call each other names because their habits are different. When, however, we consider the question of intoxicating liquors, this fact must be borne in mind, that the tendency to excess is greater than is the case with food, and that the results of excess are more serious, as regards both mind and morals.

Many things predispose to intemperance, such as early vicious surroundings, an unduly rigid training (causing reaction), and depressing influences generally. It is also favoured by the foolish idea (not yet extinct) that alcoholic exhilaration is essential to good fellowship and conviviality. When the aristocracy of intellect replaces that of the display of wealth in public esteem, it will be recognised that good fellowship and social enjoyment are favoured much more by culture and interchange of thought than by the mere "pleasures of the table." And I say this while recognising fully how much the physical *bien-aise* that re-

sults from proper food and drink contributes to vivacity of thought and sparkling speech. Genial table-talk depends much more, however, on the previous culture and intellectual development of the guests than on the quality of the repast.

The evil results of habitual intemperance are far too well known to require so much as mention here. The cardinal point which stands out conspicuously is the degradation implied in the loss of self-control. And this degradation remains whether or not the intoxication is followed by acts of shame or of violence, or by crime. That drunkenness is degrading, that it is a disgrace, this is the important point on which stress should be laid in all teaching on the subject. For the bad results that may follow do not come directly under the category of moral wrongs, and for this reason, that, strictly speaking, the drunken man has no longer any proper apprehension of the gravity of his actions. That a man should consciously allow himself to become temporarily insane, this is the great disgrace of intemperance. To this is of course added the fact that it is a disgrace as well as a moral wrong for a man who is sane not to exert control over his desires. If a drunken man be held morally responsible for crimes he may commit whilst in that condition, which is a view

that many may show good reasons for holding, then every man who becomes intoxicated must be held potentially guilty of breach of the whole moral law, because once he is intoxicated he has little or no power to restrain himself from committing the gravest crimes. When I say "potentially guilty of breach of the whole moral law," I mean that the drunkard has surrendered self-guidance, and may be considered responsible for any result of such surrender that may happen to follow. But the whole question is most complex. As George Eliot says in "Adam Bede,"—"The problem how far a man is to be held responsible for the unforeseen consequences of his own deed, is one that might well make us tremble to look into it. The evil consequences that may lie folded in a single act of selfish indulgence is a thought so awful that it ought surely to awaken some feeling less presumptuous than a rash desire to punish."

The same considerations apply exactly to indulgence in opium, or any other of the now numerous list of drugs to which people resort, with the mere object of gratifying the senses and the emotions.

When indulgence has become habitual in any stimulant or narcotic, the person passes over from the condition of sanity to that of insanity; this is indicated by the terms dipso-mania, morphio-mania,

etc., and the treatment required becomes medical rather than moral. There are some people who have, from their birth, the tendency to one or other of these forms of insanity; they should, from the first, receive proper medical attention. But it is not of these that I write; these considerations on moral pathology are intended rather for those who are sane.

The overwhelming evil wrought by drunkenness throughout the land, and among all classes of the community, is well known, and all thoughtful people concur in lamenting it and in wishing that it might be checked. The question is, How? By total abstinence? This does something; it checks symptoms. But it leaves untouched the fundamental moral disorder, namely sensuality and lack of self-control. The only other evil that can compare, in magnitude, with drunkenness is social impurity. And how is this to be checked? By celibacy? I think not. And total abstinence is no more enjoined by nature in the one case than it is in the other.

A Hungarian gentleman said to me one day: "I cannot understand this total abstinence that you have in England. When a man comes to me and says, You must not get drunk, I consider it almost insulting, as if he said, You must not steal. Why,

my mother taught me that it was disgraceful to do either the one or the other; and my respect for my mother is enough to keep me in the right path." And I thought this was very near the root of the whole matter. If a child has been led to reverence his parents, and has been taught by them to practise and admire moderation and self-control, he will remain moderate; if he has not been so taught, temperance societies can not supply him with the training necessary, and when he mixes with the world, it will not make much ultimate difference to his actions whether he has belonged to a Band of Hope or not. How often do we hear of those who have repeatedly signed the pledge, and as often given way again to intemperance? Be it noted that I am in no wise pleading against temperance societies and total abstinence; they fulfil a certain function and have their place; indeed, in that place they are indispensable. But it is a great error to suppose that they are the panacea for intemperance; they do not go far enough; they do not supply the place of proper teaching and training; they touch only the fringe of the question. I do not care to enter the arena of controversy, where epithets are freely exchanged between opposing sides, and one champion is called an amiable fanatic and the other a selfish sensualist. I would rather

preach, adapting Danton's motto, *De l'audace, de l'audace, et encore de l'audace:* Self-control, and more self-control, and again, self-control.

The question of a national beverage is, no doubt, important. In all countries drunkenness is found; but I fear I must admit that it is more prevalent in Great Britain than in most other civilised countries; and from the light wines of France and the light beers of Germany we might perhaps learn a useful lesson.

Drunkenness is commonly regarded as being more repulsive in a woman than in a man. What is the result? That whilst the proportion of total abstainers is not markedly greater among women, intemperance is decidedly less common. And, especially in the middle and upper classes, when a woman drinks she more often does so in private. The moral is clear. Let public opinion be trained to regard drunkenness as equally repulsive and disgraceful among men.

Probably no amount of argument will succeed in removing alcoholic drinks from the category of "diet," and placing them in that of "drugs." But opium and associated articles fall clearly into the class of drugs, at least in the view of Western nations. Orientals might perhaps have something to say on the other side, but we need not consider

the arguments here. The rule may be safely laid down that these drugs should not be taken except in illness and under medical advice.

The question of sexual sin cannot be passed over entirely without mention; but I do not consider that this is the place to discuss it fully. A few words must suffice.

It may be broadly stated that nature absolutely vindicates chastity, and that any other course is thickly beset with penalties. The dictum of many ages has been, "One law for the man, another for the woman." The dictum has been made by society, and nature does not support it, except in so far as the greater penalties fall upon women.

It would be Utopian to expect that this vice should be entirely eradicated, but much, at least, might be accomplished in this direction if public opinion became more healthy, and if it were tacitly understood that every wife expected her husband to come to her as pure as he expects her to come to him.

For the individual, the remedy is the same as for other forms of intemperance, self-control and the realisation of the disgrace of self-indulgence. Whatever weakens the one or fosters the other is to be condemned; and in this condemnation I would include much of the "realism" of the present day.

It achieves no good, but does a certain amount of harm. A healthy view of the matter is that taken by Carlyle ("Sartor Resartus," p. 134) in speaking of the virtue of silence: "Bees will not work except in darkness; thought will not work except in silence; neither will virtue work except in secrecy. Let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doeth; neither shalt thou prate, even to thy own heart, of 'those secrets known to all.' Is not shame the soil of all virtue, of all good manners, and good morals? Like other plants, virtue will not grow unless its root be hidden, buried from the eye of the sun. Let the sun shine on it, nay, do but look at it privily thyself, the root withers, and no flower will glad thee. Oh, my friends, when we view the fair, clustering flowers that over-wreathe, for example, the marriage bower, and encircle man's life with the fragrance and hues of Heaven, what hand will not smite the foul plunderer that grubs them up by the roots, and with grinning, grunting satisfaction shows us the dung they flourish in!"

CHAPTER XVIII.

MORAL HYPOCHONDRIASIS.

A HYPOCHONDRIAC is one who is in a continual state of anxiety about his health; and in moral pathology a parallel condition is found. A delicate and sensitive conscience is one of the most valuable gifts a man can possess; but it may become distorted, by the help of a faulty education, till it becomes a tormentor rather than a guide and monitor. Let me, in a few words, describe the moral hypochondriac. He is in the first place endowed, as a rule, with what I have called the hyper-sensitive diathesis; trivial errors are magnified to the dimensions of serious moral wrongs. Every act is followed by after-questionings; even when he has done his best under any particular circumstances, he is apt to analyse and dissect both his motives and his actions, until he is driven to conclude that he is in a very bad moral condition. He frequently takes stock of himself to see whether he is "growing

in grace," or "back-sliding." The realisation of his short-comings plunges him into a chronic gloom, in which mood he is greatly disposed to talk disparagingly of himself to all who will listen to him. He comes to take a kind of sombre pride in describing himself as a poor miserable sinner, a weak vessel; whilst often he is harassed and tortured by the fear that he has "committed the unpardonable sin." What such "unpardonable sin" may be, he often has no idea. He is very apt to incur ridicule, but in reality his condition is serious, and demands pity.

The condition is brought about in great measure by religious practices of the highly emotional and sensational type; he has been taught that all earthly interests and pursuits are to be laid aside, so that he can devote all his care and thought to "working out his own salvation."

The foundation of ordinary hypochondriasis is often dyspepsia; and a kind of moral dyspepsia is not without its share of responsibility for the condition we are considering. When a mind of limited capacity feeds largely and voraciously on ill-assorted moral and theological truths, these are not likely to be properly digested. The indigestion is shown by the formulas that are not understood, but are swallowed whole; by the technical theological terms that are used, without an idea as to their true

meaning. Religious simplicity and sincerity have been lost sight of in high-sounding phrases, complex ceremonials, and emotional stimulation. We find, on the contrary, that those who are accustomed to a plain simplicity of worship, such as the Friends, seldom exhibit the condition of moral hypochondriasis; nor is it often found among those whose minds are sufficiently developed and cultivated to understand the complexities of the higher theology.

Like all other moral disorders, moral hypochondriasis has harmful effects, which are exerted in several directions. Firstly, on the hypochondriac himself. Owing to his incessant self-examination and self-contemplation, he is unfitted to perform his proper work in the world, in considering the wants of others and in ministering to their needs. The active side of his moral nature atrophies from disuse. Moreover, hypochondriasis and pharisaism often go curiously hand in hand. While he is lamenting his own deficiency in grace, he has still leisure to contemplate the faults of others, and to find solace in the reflection that, at least, he is not so bad as "yonder publican." His mental health also is likely to suffer; and it is largely from the ranks of moral hypochondriacs that lunatic asylums are recruited, with cases of "religious mania." Secondly, there are to be considered harmful

effects on other people. All who come in contact with such an individual suffer a depressing influence. A sense of repulsion and a spirit of opposition are developed, which are very apt to foster, by reaction, either excess or a morally obtuse diathesis. Thirdly, there results harm to the cause with which the moral hypochondriac is associated; and this is always a pity, because even the faulty system which has produced him has yet its good points.

Moral hypochondriasis is found more often among women than among men. Women are naturally more religious, especially are they more emotionally religious; whilst at the same time they are not, intellectually, so well-balanced. The numerous exceptions to this do not invalidate the general statement.

The treatment of this disorder consists, principally, in the substitution of healthy for unhealthy moral and religious teaching. The latter should be, to use Oliver Wendell Holmes' expression, "depolarised," that is, the set phrases in which religious teaching is often framed should be laid aside, and the truths expressed in simple modern terms, so that their spirit can be understood. During many centuries simple religious truths have become so overlaid with tradition and

interpretation that in many cases their original form has been lost.

Moreover, the moral hypochondriac should be taught, if he is not too far diseased, that efforts to secure the well-being of others are of infinitely greater value and importance than doctoring one's own soul. Let him cease to think pre-eminently of his own salvation. The risk, after serving others, of becoming one's-self a "castaway" is exceedingly small; and if he devotes himself to the service of the social, physical, and moral health of those with whom he has to do, his own moral health may be safely allowed to take care of itself. This is the meaning of a phrase often misinterpreted, "Be not righteous overmuch." Of altruistic righteousness it is impossible to have too much; of egoistic righteousness it is quite possible. Lastly, all sensational literature is bad, and is to be avoided, whether the sensationalism be religious, emotional, or sensual.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF MORAL DISEASE—THE FORGIVENESS OF SINS.

In medical language, the sequelæ of disease are the unhealthy conditions which sometimes follow when the disease itself has got better, just as floods that have subsided leave behind them mud and refuse; and in the sphere of morals there are corresponding conditions. Doubtless, all diseases, whether physical or moral, do not leave visible traces; but many do, and in some cases the traces exist, though not readily seen.

Perhaps the most general effect of moral disease is a certain dulling of the keenness of the moral sense. Just as the sense of taste may be rendered delicate by proper training and practice—as we see in the case of tea and wine tasters—and blunted by coarse food and dietary excess, so also the moral sense, when properly treated, becomes highly sensitive and discriminating, whilst if continually

thwarted or neglected, it loses some of its virtue; but the sensitiveness may be largely or entirely restored, if the disease has not gone too far.

A second general effect is that every sin makes it easier to sin a second time in the same way. This is simply the result of the principle of habit, which enters so largely into our bodily and mental constitution. Every time an infant makes a step in learning to walk, subsequent steps are easier. Every time a verse of poetry is repeated, its retention in the memory is facilitated. There is hardly an action, bodily or mental, which is not an illustration of this principle. *Il n'est que le premier pas qui coûte.*

A third general effect is that moral disease of one kind often paves the way for other disorders. This also has its parallel in the medical world. A man who is "run down" in health by overwork, anxiety, or bad surroundings, is more likely to be attacked by diseases of different kinds than one who is quite robust. Especially do many sins lead to lying. Says the Autocrat, "Sin has many tools, but a lie is the handle which fits them all." Intemperance leads to many other forms of sin by a direct cut. Temper leads to violence of different kinds in speech and action. Many of the results of moral disease have been referred to in discuss-

ing individual disorders, and underlying them all is the weakening of self-control. For resistance to temptation depends in large measure on the conviction that resistance is possible; it may be said to depend, in fact, on the "shield of faith." Once this has been beaten by a doubt which has penetrated, it is weakened. A parallel may be drawn here also. Once a person has been hypnotised, he can be hypnotised again fairly easily, for evidently he cannot thereafter persuade himself that he is insusceptible to hypnotism. But I must here state my conviction, and insist upon it, that the man who has already yielded to temptation, even repeatedly, has still the power of resistance, if only he have a strong enough motive for it. Whatever be the motive, whether religion, the desire for a good reputation, or self-respect, if it be only strong enough, temptation will be resisted.

The last general effect of moral disease, and perhaps the most important, is the loss of self-respect. Just as the sick person who is fully convinced that he cannot recover, seriously handicaps, or even effectually baffles his physician, so the man who has lost self-respect is the most difficult to reclaim. He may even have ceased to wish to improve, and his case is then nearly hopeless. Yet is it not quite hopeless; the sympathetic spirit

will find in him some better feelings, and bring these to the light to warm him again with hope; he may be made to feel that others respect him more than he respects himself; thus may his motive for right be revived. The essence of the matter is contained in the figurative language of a popular hymn :—

"Deep in the human heart, crushed by the tempter,
Feelings lie buried which grace can restore ;
Touched by a loving hand, wakened by kindness,
Chords that were broken may vibrate once more."

Contrariwise, the quickest way to make a man an incurable is to show that you despise him. "Give a dog a bad name, and hang him."

The moral invalid in whom the first and last of these sequelæ, blunting of the moral sense and the loss of self-respect, have developed, is, indeed, in a grave condition. I should hesitate very much before pronouncing anyone to be "incurable," but if there are moral incurables, they are found in this class. By degrees the oft-repeated vices lead, through stages of moral anæsthesia, to insensibility. From a condition in which the feeble moral sense can still be roused, the patient may pass on to one in which there is apparently no response at all to appeals to his higher nature, and there may be said

to supervene a kind of moral coma. This is the spiritual death. This may perhaps occasionally happen, but let the moral physician beware of ever becoming the prophet of evil. We may fitly here apply the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes:—"A physician is not, at least ought not to be, an executioner, and a sentence of death on his face is as bad as a warrant for execution signed by the governor. As a general rule, no man has a right to tell another by word or look that he is going to die. It may be necessary in some extreme cases, but, as a rule, it is the last extreme of impertinence which one human being can offer to another. 'You have killed me,' said a patient once to a physician, who had rashly told him he was incurable. He ought to have lived six months, but he was dead in six weeks." Moreover, spiritual death is defeated by faith. If a moral invalid believes himself to be curable, he *is* curable.

Many moral disorders are not followed by the serious sequelæ that we have been discussing, but they, nevertheless, leave "moral scars." Some scars are glorious, but these are inglorious, for they speak not of victory, but of defeat in the moral conflict. Many scars are of the nature of painful memories; every person who has reached mature life has some such. They are kept as far

as possible in the mind's deepest recesses, where they may lie forgotten for years: but the touching of a very small link in the chain of associations suffices to project them into the foreground of consciousness, and the "backward fancy wakes the old bitterness again." In other cases the scars are ever present; the scar of dishonesty is thus expressed by Bernard Shaw: "The liar's punishment is not in the least that he is not believed, but that he cannot believe anyone else."[1] This is a truth of a wide application; the sensualist has lost faith in purity, the selfish man in disinterestedness, and the more a man sins, the less faith has he in humanity. For this reason the cynic is to be neither commended nor imitated; if his own moral health be good, a man cannot be truly cynical.

In harmony with the interdependence of body, mind, and morals, we find that many sequelæ of moral disease take the form of mental and bodily ill-health. Intemperance in all its forms is the most destructive of the latter, whilst it also affects the mental powers. Dishonesty undermines the judgment: indolence dissipates energy: temper unsettles the mind, and by the weakening of self-control may lead to the verge of insanity. In

[1] "Quintessence of Ibsenism," p. 3.

short, just as I began this book by insisting on the dependence of the moral condition on mental and bodily health, so now I must emphasize the dependence of these for their continuance on moral health. An old man who has spent his best years in wrong-doing seldom, if ever, has much mental capacity or good bodily health. I shall not, of course, be understood to say that ill-health, bodily or mental, in old age, indicates a wicked life. There are many other influences at work.

Further, the harmful effects of moral disease on mind and body are by no means necessarily deferred till the time of old age; on the contrary, too many men have had their health in middle age and even in early manhood undermined by moral disorders in their youth.

I must here say a few words about the "forgiveness of sins." Forgiveness of sins means the remission of the penalties of such sins by one who has been injured, and who has the power to enforce or remit the penalty. No forgiveness can make a guilty person not guilty, but forgiveness implies that such guilt is no longer remembered, or that it is no longer remembered with a view to punishment. As a rule the expression, "I forgive, but I cannot forget," is absolutely meaningless.

The forgiveness of sins is sometimes spoken of as if all the consequences and penalties of sin could thereby be repealed. This is an error. "Nature does not forgive." Transgression of natural laws brings inevitable punishment; and transgression of moral laws forms no exception. Forgiveness may eliminate the punishments decreed by moral codes, and by national laws; it cannot prevent the natural penalties. No forgiveness, human or divine, can prevent a man from having a headache the morning after a night of debauch, or remove the remorse which follows a sudden act of violence; if it could produce these results, it would be undesirable, just as much as it would be undesirable that no pain should result from a burn. These penalties are our safe-guards, our danger-signals. If a striking and terrible example of the evils of this kind of forgiveness be required, it will be found in the moral degradation brought about, in earlier days, by the sale of "indulgences." Any system which will allow a man who has acted dishonestly or selfishly to drug his conscience with a feeling that regret is unnecessary because he is forgiven, is in its essence false. Of course, remorse and regret may be disproportionate to the fault, and should then be checked, especially when they take up time and thought that might be given to

reparation and reform. This extreme has been discussed in speaking of moral hypochondriasis. But when regret is proportionate to the fault, it is very undesirable to try to remove it.

For there is one sure and certain kind of forgiveness of sins, and it consists precisely in this, in repentance and reform. For these ward off the sequelæ of moral disease of which I have spoken in the beginning of this chapter, namely, the blunting of the moral sense, the predisposition to a repetition of the fault or to the commission of others, and the loss of self-respect. In other words, repentance leads to, and reform is actually, cure. It is by repentance and reform that a man "works out his own salvation," and without them there is no forgiveness.

Further, be it remembered that Nature's penalties are not always in strict proportion to the gravity of the offence, at least as we understand such proportion. Some have appeared to remain free of penalty, and have thereby been encouraged to continue in wrong-doing. Was not the faith of the Psalmist in the stability of moral order shaken for a time because he saw "the wicked flourish like a green bay tree"? But Nature neither hastens nor delays, and sooner or later the natural retribution comes. Others, on the other hand, have found the

mental smart and it may be the bodily pain unduly severe, and have thought, "My punishment is greater than I can bear." Let these endure in patience, for how shall they know how to adjust the punishment to the fault? And by the way of repentance and reform they also will find healing.

I will close this chapter by pointing out an important respect in which all analogy between bodily and moral disease fails. The natural end of bodily disease is ultimately death, even though long periods of health intervene. The natural end of moral disease is not spiritual death, but recovery and life; at least, as far as sight can carry us towards the verge of the unknown. So the proper attitude of the individual and the race is hope, and the imitation of the spirit of

"One who never turned his back, but marched breast forward,
Never doubted clouds would break,
Never dreamed, though right were worsted, wrong would triumph,
Held we fall to rise, are baffled to fight better,
Sleep to wake."

CHAPTER XX.

TREATMENT.

THE great aim and end of medicine is to cure disease; and all other studies in pathology and diagnosis are subsidiary to this final purpose. And so it is also in the matter of moral disease. My aim in the foregoing chapters has been to so investigate the nature and conditions of origin of moral disorder as to obtain a more intelligent insight into the means of remedying them. Something has already been said about this in dealing with the principal types of moral ill-health; and here the question will be summarised and treated on somewhat general principles.

Prevention is the great object to be kept constantly in view. Life is a complex association of habits, and, in the first instance, it is as easy to form good habits as bad ones. Whereas every habit once formed becomes secondarily a part of one's nature, and alteration is then often difficult. Two things especially the child should learn: on

the subjective side, self-respect; and on the objective side, consideration for others. Self-respect leads to the primary virtues of strength (including self-control), purity and truthfulness. Consideration for others produces the fourth primary virtue, unselfishness.

The duty of teaching these things belongs, by divine right, to parents, and cannot be deputed to any one besides. The charge given to Teufelsdröckh's foster-parents in "Sartor Resartus" is the same which is given, whether or not they hear it or heed it, to all parents: "Good Christian people, here lies for you an invaluable loan; take all heed thereof; in all carefulness employ it; with high recompense or else with heavy penalty will it one day be required back." And so, amid the many heart-searchings and questionings which must occupy the thoughts of all right-minded people when the days of love and courtship are about to merge into the larger and fuller life of love and marriage, this question should be prominent, asked in truth and purity. If children are born to us, are we capable of meeting the sacred responsibility of training them? Unfortunately, children are too often regarded prospectively as accidental or necessary evils, unpleasantly complicating a drama of romantic passion intended for

two actors only! What wonder that such children, if they escape the manifold dangers of infancy, often develop into moral invalids or something worse? It is hardly necessary to point out in how large a measure healthy thoughts on this subject would work for good in the great contest of purity against intemperance.

I need not dwell further on the question of prevention, but simply refer back to what has been said in the chapters on moral hygiene.

Passing on to the subject of "cure," I will first recapitulate a few general principles.

Patients require treating individually, not collectively. General teaching in schools and pulpits has its place, which is an important one. But this alone will not suffice. Each individual has his own characteristics, his special temperament, which must be taken into account. For instance, A has been dishonest. The question is not, What is the proper moral treatment for thieves, or for liars? but rather this, What treatment does A, who has been dishonest, require? What moral flaw in him has led him into dishonesty? In other words, we must treat the patient, not the disease. By this means we shall better find out what really is the matter with our patient. The dishonesty may be but a symptom of some more deeply-seated moral

disorder. Has A told a lie, or committed a robbery, because he is intrinsically dishonest? or has it been the result of moral cowardice, or of a passion for gambling? or was it under the pressure of sudden temptation? or of dire want? Treatment of symptoms may leave the original disease untouched. Briefly stated, treatment of symptoms should be adopted only when nothing more radical is possible. In some few cases, the disease itself may be beyond cure, like a person far advanced in consumption or cancer. It is then better to relieve the symptoms, and prevent their recurrence, than to do nothing. But how much better if the disease itself can be cured.

A few moral disorders are the result of ignorance. In such cases a few explanations as to the nature and consequences of the particular evil will greatly help. But in most cases people do not act wrongly because they know no better. Consequently, to begin the treatment by a scolding, or by a long homily, will often lessen the opportunity of cure, by inducing in the patient an unfavourable frame of mind. It is necessary first to gain a patient's confidence by the manifestation of a real and earnest sympathy. This is defeated by an exordium, beginning, "You are very wicked," "Your action is disgraceful," "I can feel only contempt for

your conduct," etc. "I am sorry for you," is generally much more appropriate. It shows that one is prepared to admit that the motive has been better than the deed. And, in general, it is wise to seek out first the better points in the person's nature, to draw them out and show the incompatibility of the good and the evil. Many wrong-doers are hardened by the feeling that their moral adviser sees only their worse, and not their better side. But once this better side has been recognised and admitted, it forms a firm basis, on which the methods of cure can act, so as to build up again the fallen side of the person's nature. Nothing is to be gained by excusing, vindicating, or euphemising, a wrong action. Let that still stand out as wrong. But let the patient feel that this wrong was unworthy of his better self, and that repentance and reform place him again in a position in which he is worthy of respect and entitled to self-respect. Most people who have done wrong already feel humiliated. To try to humiliate them further has generally the effect of calling forth a spirit of defiance, and a retort of "Mind your own business; what is it to you?" If a man is disposed to humble his brother, let him first go and cast out the beam from his own eye, that he may see clearly to cast out the mote from his brother's eye. A self-righte-

ous moral physician is much more fit to be treated than to treat others. Let every moral student remember, therefore, that he has no right to trample on a patient's self-respect. On the contrary, self-respect is to be cared for. It corresponds to the good constitution which will pull a patient through. Because a man who is struck down by illness has a vigorous constitution, shall you bleed and purge him till he becomes weak? The maxim, "Starve a fever," has passed into the group of properly obsolete traditions.

Sympathy constitutes the only warrant of authority for going to a moral invalid in order to cure him. On any other pretext it is an act of gross impertinence. No man has a mandate to go indiscriminately among his fellows, pointing out their moral failings; and if he does so, he must not be surprised if he meets with the response, "When I ask for your advice, it will be time enough for you to give it."

And now as to methods and measures of treatment. If any mental or physical cause lies at the root of the moral disorder, this must, as far as possible, be set right: the hungry must be fed, the naked clothed, the sick healed. It was in this way also that the Physician of Nazareth proceeded. If the primary cause be moral, the first essential is

that the patient regret his condition and desire to be healed. This is the non-technical way of saying he must repent. For this also we have old-standing precedent. No man can be cured of moral disease against his will; for though legal or social influences may prevent or check the manifestation of symptoms, they can not alone touch the disease itself. If the desire be absent, it must be induced in the patient, by supplying him with a motive.

Something has already been said on the subject of motive, and here I must repeat that any average man can resist any temptation, if only he have strong enough motives for so doing. The fundamental motive is self-preservation. A man who can be swayed by no higher motive will resist the temptation to idleness in order to ward off starvation. Self-preservation acts in many ways. Fear of physical suffering, fear of mental trouble, fear of public opinion,—these are some of its manifestations. They are among the lowest motives, and they require to be brought into operation at times. But it is a general rule that no lower motive should be appealed to when there is a higher that will respond. There is a higher order of motives than the above still connected with self. Thus the love of ease, the desire to succeed in acquiring position,

wealth or fame,—these all have their value as motives for upright conduct. But the morality that results is a form without much vitality; it is composed largely of considerations of policy rather than based upon integrity of purpose.

Next we come to the desire, in itself laudable, for a good name and reputation. This motive is, however, compatible with moral disorder of the hypocritical kind; it may be associated with the article of faith that it is not wrong to sin, but it is wrong to be found out. But when combined with the next motive, it acts powerfully for good. The highest motive connected with self is self-respect; to this it is always right to appeal. It is not the best, but it is good, and leads to moral stability.

We pass on to a higher and more worthy set of motives, those, namely, which are connected with the welfare of others. These have also their degrees. The desire to secure the mere physical well-being of others stands lowest but it is often intimately bound up with higher considerations, such as love for those who are dependent on one. Love is, of course, one of the best and most enduring motives; and, fortunately, it is one which may hold throughout life. In the beginning there are parents who would be deeply grieved by moral failings in their children; then comes the love of

brothers and sisters; next, the love of friends, from among whom may be singled out the one who, as husband or wife, will have perhaps the strongest influence of all. This, in turn, is completed by the love for sons and daughters. Lastly, there is love for "that eternal power, not ourselves, that works for righteousness," named with reverence through all times and in all places.

There yet remains for mention the motive which forms the best basis for all others: the doing of the right simply because it is right. While this abides, other motives may fluctuate or fail, but the moral health will remain. If this motive be deficient, moral health is not secure; because even love can change. This motive is most likely to remain through life when taught in early childhood; it is implanted with difficulty in later life, especially if the guiding principle in early manhood has been policy, or some other form of selfishness.

The moral physician must, therefore, in dealing with a patient, mentally review the possible motives from the highest downwards, and urge them in turn; even in the most diseased he will find that some appeal is possible, that some motive for good remains. By so doing, he will insure the co-operation of the patient in his efforts to effect a cure.

He must next direct his attention to making it easy for the moral invalid to do right and difficult to do wrong. The force of habits and associations is strong; it must be overcome, as far as possible, by removing the patient from temptation, and by creating a new and healthy set of associations. Some care is required for this. If a confirmed invalid be transferred direct to a penitentiary, and surrounded by ceremonial moral restraints, he is likely to derive but little good; for it is impossible that he should at once acquire a liking for these things. The seclusion of the monastery, which may have a strong charm for the devoutly-minded man, will have none at all for the worldling who has been suddenly pulled-up in his worldliness.

Amid new associations, when this is possible, and amid the old when a change is not possible, the attention of the patient should next be occupied by suitable activity for mind and hands. Work is a moral safeguard, whose value it is hard to over-estimate; whilst idleness opens the door at once to all suggestions of wrong. For those who are fit for it, culture has a special value. Literature, art, and music will often help to "set the affections on things above," using this expression in its widest sense. It must, of course, be remembered that all that is called literature is not good; sen-

sationalism in all forms is to be avoided, for whatever is sensational tends to blur the sharp lines of distinction between right and wrong, often casting a glamour that is more dangerous than the most open incitement to wrong.

Unnecessary and petty restrictions are to be avoided; they tend to chafe and to irritate, and to defeat efforts for good by reaction as soon as the curb is loosened. Between this and unbridled license there is a wide and healthy margin, within which pleasure may be allowed. The greater a man's opportunities for healthy enjoyment the less will be his desire for the morbid kinds. The Roundhead Puritan favours by opposition the type of the Cavalier debauchee.

Of the curative value of punishment I shall say but little. The question of punishment generally is a very wide one; but there are two main objects of punishment: retribution and deterrence. The law must fulfil the first function; but for us, as individuals, retribution is no part of our duty. Every infraction of moral law brings with it a certain retribution, sometimes greater, sometimes less, in proportion to the fault. In loud tones Nature proclaims, "Vengeance is mine, I will repay." And in the ordinary course of things it would be highly presumptuous on our part to pose as the high priests

of Nature in executing the sentence. The deterrent value of punishment has two sides: first, the warning to others, which does not come within the scope of our subject; secondly, its effect in deterring the offender from repeating his fault. And this is obviously not so much a cure for the existing disease as a precautionary or hygienic measure against its recurrence.

There is no single panacea or remedy that will cure all forms of moral disorder. From time to time some new mode of treatment is vaunted, and institutions or societies are founded to work it. In so far as they observe the fundamental rules of treatment they are likely to succeed; but not otherwise. How many times in this century has some patent drug been puffed for the healing of bodily ailments? And by virtue of faith in their efficacy a number of cures have always at first been effected. Then the novelty wears off, and the charm somehow disappears. Why? Because the drug itself did little or nothing; the alteration of the mode of life, combined with faith, was the cause of the success. The parallel between moral and physical treatment is here a close one. Many of the would-be universal cures have been proclaimed in the name of religion, others in that of philanthropy, some in that of utilitarianism. Some